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CHAPTER I 
THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
With Lady Macbeth, John C. Calhoun could well have said, 
"That which hath made them drunk hath made me bold." Perhaps 
it is unfair to insinuate that the Great Nullifier had embibed 
too freely at the Jefferson dinner in April, 1830, but somethirg 
we feel, must have emboldened him to enter the lists in reply 
to the sharp challenge of President Andrew Jackson, when a few 
minutes before Jackson had interrupted the hitherto aimless 
toasting with, "The Federal Union-It must be preserved. 1I Giddy 
minds and drooping eyes suddenly became sober and bright. The 
President's toast had produced a marked tenseness in the ban-
quet hall. 
John C. Calhoun, South Carolina's first son, made ready to 
answer the challenge. Perhaps he had no need of the \nne of the 
evening's previous toasts to empower him to hurl a suitable 
reply at the grizzled hero of New Orleans, for the reply that he 
uttered had become part of his very being. Gradually, almost 
from the very time in 1816, when he had espoused the cause of 
consolidation and protective tariff, arguments to sustain the 
opposite opinion had been growing up within him. Circumstances 
brought Calhoun's ideas swiftly to maturity, and by 1830 he was 
foremost in the South in the fight against nationalism and high 
-2 
tariff. As the acknowledged champion of the South, he had no 
other choice but to meet the challenge of the Chief-~xecutive. 
Calhoun had proceeded too far along the nullification trail to 
turn back now. 
The toast that Calhoun proposed in reply to Jackson was an 
accurate commentary upon the course he had been pursuing since 
1816. It was in direct contrast to Jackson's terse, "The Feder-
al Union-It must be preserved. It For Andrew Jackson there never 
had been, and never could be, anything like a middle ground 
where it was question of the Union, for Jackson loved the Union 
with a love born of suffering. And to one who would threaten 
the life of that Union Jackson's treatment would be summary 
enough: "If a single drop of blood,11 he said, "Shall be shed 
in opposition to the laws of the United States, I will hang the 
first man I can lay my hands on engaged in such conduct, upon 
the first tree that I can reach."l On the strength of these 
words, we might envision the name of "Calhoun" on the hangman's 
list, heading all the rest, but Calhoun himself would never 
have admitted that his utterances against nationalism entitled 
him to so dubious a primacy, for he never tired of insisting 
that his way would insure an enduring Union. Perhaps his love 
had less of the emotional and more of the logical than Jackson's 
1 Charles E. Martin, An Introduction.!.2 the Study (.2£ ~ 
American Constitution, Oxford University Press, American 
Branch, New York, 1926, 129. 
3 
but, none the less, it was love, love founded on a firm con-
viction of the necessity of the Union. The Union, however, that 
Calhoun wished to save had little in common with the Union es-
poused by Jackson. To the South Carolinian Jackson's Union was 
inimical to liberty. The manner in which he took up Jackson's 
challenge gives clear indication as to the type of Union Calhoun 
favored: "The Union-next to our liberty the most dear. May we 
all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the 
rights of the States and distributing equally the benefit and 
the burthen of the Union." 2 Peculiar events and circumstances 
had forced this view upon Calhoun, and in turn he had bent all 
the forces of his nature towards the task of establishing it 
upon a firm constitutional foundation. The Union for which 
Jackson stood was overshadowed in Calhoun's eyes by the awful 
spectre of majority rule. It was John Calhoun's lot, then, to 
save his people, the people of South Carolina, and the people of 
the whole nation from the horrors of majority rule, from what he 
thought would amount to virtual slavery. If he was to succeed 
in this task, he must build up an argument based upon the Con-
stitution, the supreme law of the land. The people whom he 
sought to save would have salvation under no other guise. 
For this reason, the~ we must study the Constitution, if 
2 Van Buren, Autobiography, IV, 99-107, Van Buren Mss., as 
quoted in J.S. Bassett, The Life of Andrew Jackson, Macmilla 
Company, New York, 1931,~~--
we are to understand Calhoun. And since any picture o~ the 
Constitution would be incomplete without the circumstances whfu 
brought it about, we must ~irst turn our attention to the 
Articles of Confederation. 
In considering the Articles of Confederation, I have no 
desire to heap discredit upon them. That phase of Revolution-
ary History has already been quite adequately handled. At a 
time when the Colonists were doubting the wisdom of the revolt 
trom the Mother Country, the Articles of Confederation brought 
a renewal of faith. For this we must praise them. 
Remember, too, that the Articles of Co~ederation were 
fashioned after a very definite political mentality. They gave 
a constitutional form to the political philosophy that inspired 
the Declaration of Independence. 3 They were the concrete ex-
pression of the radical views that nl~tured the first seedlings 
of dissatisfaction into the full bloom of armed revolt. For 
a people lately bound to a Prince whose character was "marked 
by every act which may define a tyrant," the Articles of 
Confederation were a perfectly natural and consistent, if not 
efficient, instrument of government. In setting up the Artic~ 
the people had but invoked their privlege, by which, 
whenever any ~orm o~ Government becomes 
3 M. Jensen, The Articles of Confederation, University ot 
Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1940, 239. 
p 
destructive of these ends (namely, certain 
unalienable rights, among which are life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness) it is 
the right of the people to alter or abolish 
it, and to institute new Government, laying 
its foundation on such principles and 
organizing its powers in suoh form, as to 
them shall most like~y seem to effect their 
safety and aappiness)+ 
5 
The Colonists were irritated by the laws of men in whose election 
they had no voice. Unbearable to them was a rule whose seat lay 
far aoross the sea. No distant government, they determined, 
would operate upon them as the distant moon controls the tide's 
ebb and flow. Their's was the power, and consequently, If ••• 
magistrates are their servants, and at all times smeanable to 
them~5 
Clearly, the Thirteen Colonies mistrusted distant govern-
ment and the tendency to nationalization. Was it any wonder, 
then, that the Articles of Confederation reflect these fears? 
If for the sake of resistance, they had need of forming a 
unified politioal body, it would be a body whose members were 
all of equal importanoe, and a body whose head was carefully 
subordinated to its members. Understanding, as we now do, the 
mind from whose fertility the Articles of Confederation had 
4 "Deolaration of Independence, If in Doouments Illustrating the 
Formation of the Union of the United States, edited by C. 
Tansill, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1927, 
22. 
5 "Virginia Bill of Rights," as quoted in ~ History of ~ 
United States, by Ralhp V. Harlow, Syraouse University Press 
Syracuse, New York,. 1932, I, 117. 
6 
sprung, we may consider the Articles themselves. 
One of the chief characteristics of the Articles of Con-
federation was the provision for the distribution of power. Con-
gress was to have certain delegated powers and no others. There 
was nothing in the Articles which Congress might construe as 
granting to itself hegemony over the individual states. In fact, 
9ne of the authors of the Articles, John Dickinson, had attempted 
to include just such a loophole. Dickinson was stoutly opposed 
on this point and eventually his proposal was stricken from the 
pages of the Articles. The instrument was then made to read: 
Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom 
and independence, and every power, juris-
diction, and right Which is not by this con-
federation expressly delegated to the United 
States in Congress assembled. 6 
Today these powers which Congress received would seem hardly 
more than enough to warrant its existence. It had authority 
to declare war and conduct foreign affairs. Congress might 
control its own coinage and that of the states, but it had no 
means of regulating the issuance of paper money within the 
various states. In disputes between the states, Congress was 
constituted the last court of appeal. The direction of the 
postal service and the regulation of weights and measures also 
came under the jurisdiction of Congress. During the periods 
6 Documents Illustrative of ~ Formation of the Union, 27. 
7 
when the Congress itself was not in session, a committee 
appointed by Congress was to handle the business of government. 
These, in general, were the main powers granted to Congress by 
the states. 
With the powers of Congress so very limited under the 
Articles, we expect the states to possess vast powers. Indeed, 
checks upon state authority, as the Congress found repeatedly, 
were few, "and even these tended to be qualified out of 
existence."7 A state was bound to consult Congress before 
making treaties with any foreign power. The duties and imposts 
of states must not conflict with agreements made by Congress in 
treaties. But Congress, on the other hand, might not interfere 
with the right of a state to levy the same taxes on foreigners, 
as it did on its own citllens. No state could maintain men-of-
war or troops without the approval of Congress. No state could 
undertake hostilities against a foreign power, unless Congress 
had first given its assent to such a course. But none of these 
stipulations was a serious interference with state sovereignty. 
In respect to each other, states were equal, irrespective 
of area or population. Each state was required to send two 
representatives to Congress and no state was to send more than 
seven. In voting, each state was allowed one vote. 
7 Jensen, 243. 
" ~------------------------------------------------------~ 8 
The Articles of Confederation, then, were the instrument of 
a truly federative government, that left little or no room for 
the growth of a strong central power. This form was the result 
••• of the belief that democracy was 
possible only with fairly small political 
units whose electorate had a direct check 
upon the offices of government. Such a 
check was impossible where the central 
government was far removed from the control 
of the people by distance and by law ••• 
The distrust of centralization, of govern-
ment spread over a great area was the 
product of both political theory and 
practical experience.8 
So far, we have considered the philosophy that animated the 
Articles of Confederation and the actual content of the Articles. 
In line with our purpose, we must now consider the effects Which 
the Articles produced. We ask, "Were the Articles successful, 
or did they fail to' accomplish their end?fI This question, 
however, is easier asked than answered. Depending on one's 
point of view, it could be answered either affirmatively or 
negatively. Granting that the Articles were of a certain 
temporary adVantage to all, it is sufficient for our purpose to 
note that the Articles of Confederation were in time displaced, 
and, more important, to consider the reasons for their displace-
mente 
To render possible the smooth functioning of even the loose 
8 Ibid., 244. 
, -_. --------------------------------~ 
9 
Confederacy intended by the Articles, this instrument would 
have needed substantial changes. The inherent weaknesses of ~ 
Articles of Confederation, coupled with the conditions of the 
period, worked the complete undoing of the Articles. European 
powers were loathe to deal with a Congress that had no coercive 
power over the individual states. They could see no future, 
for example, in granting rinancial aid to a group that was wit 
out power to enforce any provisions ror repayment. With regard 
to the debts already contracted, Congress could do nothing but 
recommend that each state pay its share. As a rule, it takes 
more than the power of suggestion to make a man part with his 
money and the Revolutionary Colonists were no exception. The 
debts remained unpaid, and the credit or the United States 
abroad would hardly have been sufficient to supply tobbacco ror 
the members of Congress. 
Added to the weakness of the American position in Europe, 
the financial situation at home was equally infirm. Congress 
had no satisfactory means of raising money and was entirely 
dependent on state requisitions. Robert Morris summed up the 
condition when he wrote: 
Imagine the situation of a man who is to 
direct the finances of a country almost 
without revenue ••• surrounded by creditors 
whose distresses, while they increase 
their clamors, render it more difficult 
to appease them; an army ready to dis-
band or mutiny; a government whose sole 
~-' ----------------------------~~ 10 
authority consists in the power or 
rraming recommendations.9 
It was impossible now ror the harried superintendent or finance 
to rloat more paper money. The value or Continental currency 
had so depreciated, that as early as 1781, $1000 would bring but 
one dollar of hard money. To make the outlook still darker, 
there seemed to be no immediate hope or recovery. It was use-
less to think or recuperation through benericial commercial 
treaties, since Congress could give no assurance that the states 
would abide by them. In ract, even the most benericial treaty 
would be righting heavy odds, when rorced to gain thirteen 
separate approvals. A case in point was the peace treaty with 
England, which some states had not even attempted to obey. John 
Jay could rant and rave till weak with exhaustion that, 
when a treaty is constitutionally made and 
ratiried and published by Congress, it 
immediately becomes binding on the whole 
nation, and superadded to the laws or the 
land without the interventionA consent or 
riat or state legislature ••• lu 
But states that could not be rorced or coerced in any way would 
hold nothing sacred, and John Jay's words would never change 
matters. 
9 Wharton, "Correspondence or the American Revolution," as 
quoted in A.C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History or the 
United States, D. Appleton,-New York, 1935, 145. -- ---
10 "Secrets Journals or the Acts and Proceedings or Congress," 
as quoted in The Conrederation and the Constitution, A.C. 
McLaughlin, Harpers, New York, 190~5. 
~----------------------------------------------------l-l--~ 
With the finance of the country so shaky, bickering and 
disunion between the states WaS accentuated even to the point 
where inter-state war could well be feared. Where there was 
profi t to be reaped,· the primordial urge of the states to reap 
it waS exceedingly strong, and at such time ties of common 
suffering and common aims went by the boards. states with 
commercial advantages were quite willing to make their sister 
states feel the-weight of these advantages. James Madison 
aptly described this situation when he said that the states, 
••• having no convenient ports for foreign 
co~~erce were subject to be taxed by their 
neighbors, through whose ports their 
commerce was carried on. New Jersey, 
placed between Philqdelphia and New York 
was likened to a cask tapped at both ends; 
North Carolina, between Virginia and South 
Carolina, to a patient bleeding at both 
arms. 11 
Alarming too was a growing sense of lawlessness and 
irresponsibility among the people. Rioting and violence were 
becoming more frequent, a natural outgrowth perhaps of a 
successful revolt, but, none the less, signs of certain ruin 
for the new nation, were they allowed uninhibited growth. 
Characteristic of this tendency was the revolt led by Daniel 
Shays in 1786. A captain in the Revolutionary Army, Daniel 
Shays led a group of aebt ridden and disgruutled farmers in an 
11 Max Farrand, The Framing of ~ Constitution of the United 
States, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1913, 7. 
12 
attempt to overthrow the government of Massachusetts. The 
revolt was squarely met and soon withered away. Futile and inpt 
as this revolt was in itself, it was not without effect upon the 
country at large. Men who would have lost greatly, if anarciIY 
should rule, were throughly alarmed. General Knoxv01ned this 
alarm in a letter to Washington which treated of this insurgent 
spiri t: 
Their creed is that the property of the 
United States has been protected from the 
confiscation of Britain by the joint 
exertions of all, and therefore ought to 
be the common property of all; and he 
that attempts to oppose this creed is an 
enemy to equity and justice, and ought to 
be swept from off the face of the earth ••• 
They are determined to annihilate all 
debts, public and private and have 
agrarian laws ••• 12 
This sentiment of Knox was that of the outstanding men of 
the nation. To men like Washington, Hamilton and Madison the 
Articles of Confederation stood in need of sUbstantial altera-
tion. They had been tried and found wanting. The sun of 
radical views, the views that fostered the Revolution and in-
spired the Declaration of Independence, was beginning to set. 
Now, it was felt, the time had come to make a change. 
Accordingly, in 1787, a Convention whose membership included 
some of the outstanding men of the country, met at Philadelphia. 
12 Letter of Henry Knox to George Washington, October 23, 1786, 
as quoted in R.V. Harlow, The Growth of the United States, 
Henry Holt and Company, Ne~ork, 1943, ~25-226. 
~-------------------------------------------1-3~ 
Edward Randolph, Governor o~ Virginia, in an opening address 
voiced the spirit which was common to all the delegates, albeit 
in varying degrees. "The Con~ederation," he said, "was made in 
the infancy of the science of constitutions ••• " People had 
been sufficiently naive to think that the power of requisition-
ing funds from the states would furnish Congress with thewbere 
withal to conduct a government. They had not known how willing 
and even eager the states would be to cut at one another's 
throats to further sectional and local commercial interests. 
They had no way of foreseeing that the Articles of Confedera-
tion would make it possible for a spirit o~ anarchy and revolt 
to spread abraod in the land and that these same Articles 
make it impossible ~or the country ever to cancel out its 
mous foreign debt. What premonition had they o~ the poor 
treaties would receive from the different states? 
Articles of Confederation were ratified at a time "when nothi 
better could have been conceded by the states jealous of their 
sovereignty.ft But since the days of their inception, Randolph 
observed, hard experience had taught these lessons to the 
people o~ America. The Articles, they must now understand, 
really afforded very little protection against foreign aggres-
sion, since Congress was unable either to prevent or conduct a 
war. If a state chose to violate a treaty, or some precept of 
international law, what was Congress to do? Should a quarrel 
break out among the states, the Congress was impotent to 
effect any reoonoiliation, nor oould it even attempt interven-
tion in a state where the oitizens were in revolt against the 
established government. In the face of injurious foreign 
commercial regulations, Congress had no powers other than those 
of an oratorioal cast which American foreign ministers might 
chance to possess. And by nature, the Articles seemed incapble, 
Randolph thought, of ever bringing any improvment in the 
lamentable condition of national affairs, for: 
From the manner in whioh it has been 
ratified (i.e~, The Artioles of Confeder-
ation) in many of the states, it oannot 
be olaimed to be paramount to the state 
oonstitutionsj so that there is a pros-
peot of anarohy from the inherent laxity 
of the government. As the remedy, the 
government to be established must have 
for its basis the republican principle. 13 
13 George Banoroft, History of the Constitution of the United 
States, Appleton and Company~ew York 1885, II,-ro. 
CHAPT.B."'R II 
THE CONSTITUTION 
With these words or Randolph serving as a summary or what 
has gone berore, we may undertake a study or the Constitution 
or the United States. Naturally, since the main topic of our 
discussion is the political theory or John C. Calhoun, our con-
sideration or the Constitution will be limited by this end. We 
shall search the Constitution, trying all the while to discover 
just what it contained that made it possible ror Calhoun to 
conceive and bring to rinal parturition his theory on the 
Constitution. Just as we could not properly understand the 
Constitution without some knowledge or what preceded it, so we 
would rind Calhoun difficult to comprehend, unless we rirst 
gave some attention to the Constitution. 
There is, I believe, a good deal of truth in the state-
ment or Doctor Von Holst that, 
Calhoun and his disciples were not the 
authors of nullification and secession. 
T4at question is as old as the constitu-
tion itself, and has always been a 
living one, even when it has not been 
one of life and death. Its roots lay 
in the actual circumstances or the time, 
and the constitution was the living 
expression of these actual circumstances. l 
1 Von Holst, History £! the United States, Chicago, I, 19. 
~---------------------------------------------l-6-' 
What we have already considered in regard to the Articles of 
Oonfederation, gives added acceptability to Von Holst's statement. 
These Articles were the product of a radical philosophy of govern. 
ment, inspired by a keen regard for the rights and sovereignty 
of the individual states. They were an instrument designed to 
secure the states against any repetition of the far away bureau-
cracy whose power had so recently been destroyed. By the time of 
the Constitutional Convention no great change had come in th~se 
ideas. True, the Articles had certain glaring weaknesses, weak-
nesses, however, that were generally believed not beyond remedy; 
and so the Convention of 1787 was called, for the purpose of 
drawing up amendments to the Articles of Confederation. Almost 
no one within the Convention had the least inkling of what the 
final result of the Convention would be; certainly· few, if any, 
outside it could even have dreamed what would transpire at 
Philadelphia from May to September, 1787. 
Writing as we are in this day of the federal government.s 
omnipotence, it is a frightful laboring of the obvious to remark 
that a group at the Convention felt that the Articles of Con-
federation were beyond repair. To them, salvation lay in the 
fashioning of a new instrument. Minds like those of Hamilton, 
Washington, Madison or Wilson had alway been, or had grown in 
time, quite out of harmony with the political opinions held by 
~---------------------------------------------------1-1~ 
the common run or men. They had a thorough going mistrust or 
a democracy that could breed the revolt or Daniel Shays. Ir 
the country was to avoid anarchy and ruin, they would have to 
exceed the limits of the power granted to them. The people had 
sent them, it was true, for the purpose or amending the Articles 
of Conrederation, but, "Thepeople," as Elbridge Gerry or 
Massachusetts declared, "do not want virtue, but are the dupes 
or pretended patriots. u2 
Thus we meet in the Convention an element strongly in 
favor of disregarding instructions received concerning the 
nature or the Convention. That the delegates ravoring a radical 
change in the government were well aware or the delicacy of 
their position, there can be no doubt. In this regard, it is 
significant that all the members of the Convention were bound 
to strict secrecy concerning the proceedings of the Convention, 
in order, as Von Holst says, 
••• that the questions in controversy might 
not be dragged immediatly berore the rorum 
of an excited and angry people and all 
prospect of an understanding thus destroyed 
from the very beginning.3 
By the untimely wagging of some dissenting tongue, the whole 
2 Madison's Papers, edited by Gilpin, as quoted in Bancroft, 
II, 11. 
3 Von Holst, I, 51. 
~-------------------18~ 
convention could have received a death blow. The problem 
facing these men was tremendous. They could be well nigh 
certain that failure at this time would mean the loss of all 
that had been bought so dearly in the Revolution. The words of 
Gouverneur Morris, spoken in perhaps the darkest hour of the 
Convention, were only too true: "This country must be united. 
If persuasion does not unite it, the sword w111. 1t4 Since 
Congress had been at so great a disadvantage in its relations 
with the states, it seemed advisable to establish a government 
which would deal directly with the people.5 But how could they 
do this in a manner which the people would understand? Never 
would the Colonists consent to see their states made tools of a 
national government. Any new instrument of government must be 
made to strike a balance of power between state and national 
government. 
The exact manner in which this balance was to be had pro-
vided a subject of fierce debate in the Convention. As we have 
seen, all were in agreement that some change was needed, but as 
to the extent of this change, there was a very marked disagree-
mente Some felt that with certain amendments the Articles of 
Confederation could be ~etained, thus leaving the balance of 
4 
5 
Madison's Writings, (Hunt's edition,) as quoted in A.C. 
McLaughlin's, !h! Confederation ~ the Constitution, 237. 
J. Fiske, The Critical Period of American History, Houghton 
and Mifflin, Boston, 1897, 233. 
~--------------------------------------------------19--~ 
power with the states. still others believed that no quarter 
should be shown the Articles. In their stead must be errected 
a government decidedly national in its tone, with powers in 
excess of those wielded by the states. The ideas of those who 
favored state power were embodied in the New Jersey, or small 
state plan, while those who favored some kind of national regime 
adhered to the Virginia, or large state plan. It is not to our 
purpose here to treat either one or these plans at any length. 
It will be well enough merely to review them in broad outline, 
as a means or better understanding the Constitution as it finallJ 
issued from the hands of the Fathers. 
The plan, then, presented by William Patterson of New 
Jersey was intended to revivify t~e Articles ot Confederation. 
It would provide Congress with the powers without which, as 
experience had proved, that body was utterly helpless. Congress 
might now 
pass acts for raising a revenue by levying 
a duty or duties on all goods or merchan-
dize of foreign growth or manufacture, im-
ported into any part of the United states •• ~ 
to be applied to such federal purposes as 
they shall deem proper and expedient, and 
make rules and regulations for the collec-
tion thereof.6 
Congress was also granted the power, to "pass Acts for the 
regulation" of trade and commerce as well with foreign nations 
6 Formation of ~ Union, (Documents,) 967. 
~--------------------------------------------------~2~O~ 
as with each other."7 Congress retained its former authoriza-
tion to make "requsitions" upon the states, which were to be 
made in proportion not only to the whole number of white 
inhabitants but also to 
other free citizens and inhabitants of every 
age aex and condition including those 
bound to servitude for a term of years & 
three fifths of all other persons not com-
prehended in the foregoing description, ex-
cept Indians not paying taxes; that if such 
requisitions be not complied with, in the 
time specified therein, to direct the 
collection thereof in the noncomplying 
states and for that purpose to devise and 
pass acgs directing and authorizing the 
same ••• 
As a further reinforcement for the Articles, a federal 
executive and judiciary were to be established. Recognizing 
the need for some check upon the whim of individual states, if 
any union at all was to survive, the New Jersey Plan, after 
declaring congressional acts supreme and binding on the states, 
was willing to level recalcitrant states by force: 
••• if any State, or any body of men in any 
State shall oppose or prevent the carrying 
into execution such acts or treaties, the 
federal executive shall be authorized to call 
forth the power of the Confederated States to 
enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts 
or an observance of such treaties.9 
7 Ibid., 967. 
8 Ibid., 968. 
9 IbId., 969. 
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The Virginia or large state plan presented by William 
Randolph, outlined changes more far reaching in their scope. 
At the outset this plan declared its purpose to be that of en-
abling the Articles of Confederation "to accomplish the objects 
proposed by their institution; namely, common defense, security 
of liberty and general welfare. nlO A bicameral legislature 
was proposed, in which suffrage Itought to be proportioned to 
the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabi-
tants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different 
cases. till This national legislature retained all Congressional 
power given under the Articles of Confederation. In addition, 
it was supposed to Itlegislate in all cases to which the 
separate states are incompetent, or in which the harmony of 
the United states may be interrupted by the exercise of 
individual legislation. tl 1 2 
Another important concession to the national legislature 
was the ability to t'negati ve all laws passed by the several 
states contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature 
the articles of the Union. tl13 A national executive was to be 
set up who was, "besides a general authority to execute 
10 Ibid., 953. 
11 "fbI'd., 95,3. 
12 Ibid., 954. 
13 Ibid., 954. 
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National laws, ••• to enjoy the Executive rights vested in 
Congress by the Conf'ederation. 1l14 The institution of a national 
judiciary was yet another marked departure from the traditional 
Articles. Among other powers, this tribunal waS to have 
jurisdiction in cases, 
in which foreigners or citizens of other 
states applying to such jurisdiction may be 
interested, or which respect the collection 
of the National revenue; impeachments of any 
National officers, and questions which m~y 
involve the national peace and harmony.l~ 
Mindful of the almost paralyzing debility of the Articles 
in retarding undue activity on the part of the states, the 
Virginia plan enabled Congress effectively to obstruct imperious 
state demands. To this end was directed the c~ause which de-
manded that lithe Legislative, Executive and Judiciary powers 
within the several states ought to be bound by oath to support 
the articles of Union. l1l6 In the line of actual physical force, 
Congress might lIcall forth the force of the Union against any 
member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the 
Articles thereof."17 
Obviously, this system of Randolph contemplated something 
more than a confederation of the states. Were this plan to 
receive ratification the states might conceivably have some mis-
14 1E.!£., 954. 
15 Ibid., 954. 
16 Ibid., 955. 
17 Ibid., 955. 
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givings over the continued existence of their ttsovereignty, 
freedom and independence." The instrument that eventually 
was fashioned bore marks of both these plans. It was a patch 
work of compromise. In the closing pages of· this chapter, we 
sball examine the document that actually did come into being 
after nea~ly four months or continued labor. 
That we may understand the real character of our govern-
ment, it will be well to consider the Constitution, as Madison 
says, 
in relation to the foundation on which it 
is to be established; the sources from 
which its ordinary powers are to be drawn; 
to the operation of those powers, to the 
extent of them; and to the authority by 
which future changes in the government 
are to be introduced. 18 
And if we consider the Constitution in relation to the 
foundation upon which it is established, we find that our 
Constitution is federal rather than national. 19 The truth of 
this statement is evident from the mode of ratification. For 
ratification came not from a majority of individuals composing 
one entire natione, nor even from a majority of the states, but 
ratification took place by the unanimous consent of those 
states which were to become parties to the Constitution. The 
18 C.A. Beard, The Enduring Federalist, New York, 1948, 165. 
19 "Federal" is here used in the sense of a confederation, and 
should not be confused with our present day meaning, viz., 
"federal government. 1I 
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people of the United States were not considered as one nation 
in which the majority would control the minority. Rather, "each 
state in ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sover-
eign body, independent of all others, and only to be bound by 
its own voluntary act. tt20 
What, we ask, are the sources from which the ordinary 
powers of our Constitution are drawn? The lower house of 
Congress has its powers from the people, who are represented 
in this body, tlin the same proportion, and on the same prin-
ciple as they are in the legislatures of a particular state." 21 
These are the tokens of a national rather than a federal 
government. The upper house, on the other hand, has its 
members elected by the state legislatures and thus has its 
power from the individual states. 22 In this respect, then, 
our government is federal, not national. The executive power 
of our government is very complex in nature, possessing both 
federal and national features. In the first instance, the 
President is elected by the states in their political 
characters, through a system in which, "the votes allotted 
to them are in compound ratio, which considers them partly as 
distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of 
the same society." In case of a disputed election, the choice 
20 
21 
22 
Ibid., 16~. 
Ibid., 160. 
By amendment, Senators are now elected by the people. 
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. of President "is to be made by that branch of the legislature 
which consists of the national representatives;" but for the 
performance of this particular legislative function, "they are 
to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from 
so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. 1t Thus we may 
see that the executive branch of our government has a very 
mixed character, IJpresenting at least as many federal as 
national features."23 
In operation our government is national more than federal, 
since it is designed to act upon citizens in their individual 
capacities. But in some operations this national designation 
is not entirely apt, for when a dispute arises between the 
states, these states must be looked on in their collective 
and political capacities. This departure from the national 
character is unavoidable in any plan, and, 
••• the operation of the government on the 
people, in their individual capacities, in 
its ordinary and most essential pro-
ceedings may on the whole, designate it~4 
in this relation a national government. 
This national stamp, however, fades when we consider 
the extent of the governmental powers. The idea of a national 
government usually connotes an unlimited supremacy, keeping, of 
course, within the bounds of legal action. There is, however, 
Ibid., 166. 
Ibid., 166. 
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no unlimited supremacy for our government, which has only 
certain enumerated powers, while the individual states take 
all powers no so enumerated. The fact that disputes relating 
to the boundary of a certain power are to be settled by a 
tribunal established under the national government, does not 
alter the nature of the case. Our government, then, in regard 
to the extent of its powers is a federal government. 
The amending clause in our Constitution reveals both 
national and federal qualities, though perhaps neither of these 
predominates. If we reflect that the consent of more than a 
majority of the states, (not the citizens) is needed to amend 
the instrument of government, we must acknowledge a federal 
government; on the other hand, when we see that less than a 
unanimous state acceptance is sufficient for emendation, we are 
forced to admit a national element. 
We must conclude, therefore, that our government partakes 
now of a national character, now of a federalist character and 
is actually a combination of both these types of government. 
For we have seen, that at its foundation, as Madison says, our 
government 
••• is federal not national; in the 
sources from which the ordinary powers 
of the government are drawn, it is partly 
federal and partly national; in the 
operation of these powers, it is nationa~ 
not federal; in the extent of them, again, 
it is federal, not national; and finally, 
in the authoritative mode of introducing 
amendments, it is neither wholly federal 
nor wholly national. 25 
25 Ibid., 167-168 • 
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CHAPTER 11+ 
BACKGROUND OF CALHOUN'S THEORY 
So far we have been laboring with ph:e purpose of fixing 
a strong foundation for our work. Now that we have, I think, 
accomplished a sturdy ground work for our ideas, we may 
reasonably begin, to retain the metaphor, our super structure. 
The doctrine at Calhoun, as we have said, is inextricably 
bound up with the Constitution of the United States. No one, 
we think, would be able to grasp the ideas of the Great 
Nullifier without knowing the Constitutional story and the 
surroundings in which that story was laid. 
Just as heretofore we have considered the more remote 
origins of Nullification, so now, we will look upon events and 
conditions that led John C. Calhoun to follow a course that 
would make him the foremost teacher of political theory in 
southern polities. John Calhoun's earliest political love was 
the Union; a far cry from his later passion for the rights 
of the states. As a young Congressman, he belonged heart and 
soul- to the War Hawks, and as Chairman of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations he actually introduced the bill for the 
declaration of War in 1812. During the war his leadership in 
Congress was so outstanding, as to cause one of his 
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contemporaries to refer to him as the "young Hercules" who had 
carried the War on his shoulders. 
The threat to union latent in the Hartford Oonvention 
caused Oalhoun genuine alarm. A disunited America could not, 
he felt, hope to expand and so fulfill its high destiny among 
the nations. The means which seemed best suited to check this 
spirit of narI'OW sectionalism were to be found in legislation 
of a national character. This was the legislation which, afte~ 
wards, Henry Olay was to christen the "American System." 
Oalhoun ardently espoused a bill chartering the Second 
Bank of the United States and proposed using the million and 
a half dollars,which the charter was to cost the banks, for 
internal improvments. And, most ironical of all, in view of 
subsequent events, at a critical point in the discussion on 
the Tariff of 1816, Oalhoun was summoned to speak on its 
behalf. He saw the Tariff as a means of giving strength to 
the Union, and so spoke forcefully in its favor. 
Quite in keeping with his position as high-priest of 
nationalism, were his views on the Constitution. Pointing 
with perfect consistency to his record, he could well say, ttl 
am no advocate for refined arguments on the Oonstitution. 
This instrument was not intended as an instrument for the 
logician to exercise his ingenuity on. It ought to be 
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construed with plain good common sense."l Even as late as 
1823 he was to write that "the Supreme Court of the Union per-
forms the highest functions under our system. It is the me-
diator between sovereigns, the State and General Governments, 
and (draws) the actual line which separates their authority." 2 
To SUbstantiate his views on the advisability of a strorg 
national government, he invoked the authority of no less a 
personage than Alexander Hamilton, whose name had become 
syononmous with nationalism. In a letter to Hamilton's son, 
he wrote that he had, 
••• a clear conviction, after much re-
flection and an entire knowledge and fa-
milarity with the history of our country 
and the working of our government that his 
(the elder Hamilton's) policy as developed 
by the measures of Washington's adminis-
tration, is the only policy for this 
country. 3 
As a firm believer in the Union, he could see no par-
ticular reason for alarm, when an attempt was made to exclude 
slavery from Missouri. He was at pains to warn his southern 
colleagues, that they, 
••• ought not to assent easily to the be-
1 J.C. Calhoun, Works, R.K. Cra11e, (editor), 6 volumes, New 
York, 1854, II, 192. 
2 Calhoun to Virgil Maxcy, July 11, 1823, Markoe Papers, as 
quoted in The Journal of Southern History, "Calhoun's 
TransitionTrom Nationalism," February, 1948, 40. 
3 James A. Hamilton, "Reminiscences," as quoted in The Journal 
of Southern HistorY,·'February, 1948,_ 40. -
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lier that there is a conspiracy either 
against our property or just weight in 
the Union •••• Nothing would lead more 
directly to dis-union with all its 
horrors' •••• Ir we, rrom such a belier, 
systematically oppose the North, they 
must rrom necessi4t y resort to similar opposition to us. 
Expoundin&as he did, such impartial and unpartisan views, it 
was little wonder that Calhoun should rind a place in the heart 
or John Quincy Adams. But still, this was something or an 
accomplishment, ror there were many who honestly doubted 
whether the rrigid New Englander really did possess that vial 
organ. Adams wrote or Calhoun, that he was "above all section-
al and ractious prejudices more than any other statesman or 
this union with whom I have ever acted."5 
In an errort to reconcile this almost rampant nationalism 
with Calhoun's later utterances, modern psychology would 
probably consign the Carolinian to a dual personality and let 
the matter go. Convenient as this procedure might at times 
prove, we reel another explanation would bring us nearer the 
truth. The fact was that the sands or public opinion in South 
Carolina were beginning to shirt. In the early days of the 
Constitution, South Carolina, like Calhoun himself, had been 
" 
accustomed to burn incense at the altar or nationalism. Her 
4 Calhoun to Charles Tait, October 26, 1820, as quoted in 
The Journal ~ Southern History, February, 1948, 40. 
5 H. Von Holst, Calhoun, Houghton & Mirrlin, 1899, 54. 
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sonS had been outstanding in the crusade to "form a more per-
fect union." But as time passed, conditions made it expedient 
for South Carolina to forsake the past with its traditions and 
look to the security of her position in the present. By 1825 
it was apparent to all that South Carolina was undergoing a 
financial decline. Calhoun, if he wished to prevent a similar 
decline in his own political career, was faced with the necess~ 
ity of forsaking the past and lending his talent and energy to 
the task of arresting the decline of his native state. 
There are a number of facts that must come under consider-
ation when we delve into the cause of the economic decay which 
had come to pass in South Carolina at this time. To assign 
preeminence to one definite cause is to run serious risk of 
falling into error, but even if we could arrive at a certain 
conclusion on this matter, our purpose here, at any rate, 
would derive little benefit. It will be sufficient for us to 
examine the palpable results of this decline and then consider 
the factors wnich probably brought it about. 
In 1825, George McDuffie, a faithful Calhoun man, 
attempted to fix the blame for the ruin that had befallen 
South Carolina upon the cheap public lands that were being 
opened in the West. South Carolina's white population was 
showing a rate of increase far below that of the rest of the 
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united states. For the period from 1800 to 1830, the state's 
white population had an average increase of about one fourth 
that experienced in the rest of the country for this period. 6 
In McDuffie's eyes, though he could at that time have had no 
knowledge of the actual figures, the West was a strong lure 
which few South Carolinians seemed able to resist. He pictured 
the results of the government's land policy in strong terms: 
In no part of Europe, he said, will you 
see the same indications of decay (as in 
the South.) Deserted villages-houses 
falling into ruins-impoverished lands 
thrown out of cultivation. Sir, I believe, 
that if the public lands had never been 
sold, the aggregate amount of the national 
wealth would have been greater at the 
moment •••• But, while the Government con-
tinues, as it now does, to give them 
away, they will draw the population of the 
older States, and will still further in-
crease the effect which is already dis-
tressingly felt, and which must go to 
diminish the value of all those States 
possess.7 
To push back McDuffie's argument one step farther, we 
might ask what it was that gave land in the West its powerful 
attraction for the people of South Carolina. The constant 
planting of cotton year after year, with no thought of soil 
conservation, had robbed the soil of its fertility. When new, 
6 F. Bancroft, Calhoun and the South Carolina Nullification 
Movement, The Johns Hopkin;-Press, Baltimore, 1928, 21. 
7 Congressional Debates, 1824-1825, as quoted in Bancroft, 22. 
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fertile land could be had in the West almost for the taking, 
few were content to stay in South Carolina and barely eke out 
an existence. Besides the depopulation of South Carolina, 
another evil attended the westward trek to the rich basin of 
the Mississippi River. The immense productivity of this new 
land served to put more cotton on the market than ever berore. 
And as this vast increase in the cotton supply was far in ex-
cess of the demand for that product, the result was that the 
price of cotton dropped sharply. A reference to the United 
state's Treasurer's Report for the years 1855-1856 serves to 
illustrate this pOint. 9 
Though perhaps few Southerners would have been disposed 
to admit it, slavery too played a role in South Carolina's 
economic tragedy. Because of slavery, South Carolina and 
all the slave states, were shackeled to an agrarian economy. 
As long as the institution or slavery persisted, the South woUld 
9 In 1821 the production of cotton in the United States was 
124,900,000 pounds and the average price was sixteen cents; 
in 1832 the production was 322,200,000 pounds and the 
average price was ten cents. The production had more than 
doubled, the price had fallen considerably less than one 
half. In 1823 the production was 173,700,000 pounds, and 
the average price was twelve cents; in the following year 
the production was 142,000,000 pounds, and the average price 
was sixteen cents. (Report or the Secretary of the 
Treasury, 1855-1856, as quoted in David F. Houston, The 
Story of Nullification in South Carolina, Longmans, Green 
and Company, New York, IE'96, 44. 
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never attempt to manufacture on a large scale. This would 
leave the South alw"ays at the mercy of nortllern manufacturing 
interests. Admittedly, the South was by nature much less 
suitable for manufacturing than the North, but the existence 
of slavery foreced the South to put off any sizeable industrial 
development till long after the Civil War. This trend to 
industrialization was bound to come, and slavery, which but 
postponed its arrival, greatly weakened the South. It is 
noteworthy that even as early as the third decade of the nine-
teenth century, there were Southerners who understood that 
the South, to keep its position of equality in the Union, must 
turn to manufacturing, but in the South, "Cotton was King,1I 
and slavery had enthroned it.lO 
In an address to Congress, George McDuffie threatened 
that, if South Carolina was forced to the factory experiment, 
her slave labor would soon enable these factories to offer 
effective competition to northern manufacturers. Within a few 
years, however, he was of another mind. He "had examined the 
subject more closely, and had discovered that slavery would 
prevent an experiment from being made. fill 
But the people of South Carolina were not willing to 
10 C.S. Boucher, The Nullification Controversy in South 
Carolina, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916, 21. 
11 Houston, 41. 
I 
i;' 
attribute their financial distress to the above mentioned con-
ditions. Almost to a man, they considered the Tariff as the 
implacable foe of their material well being.lo2 A memorial pre-
sented to the United States Senate by the people of Charleston 
showS how bitter was the anti-tariff felling: 
Against a system ••• designed to elevate one 
interest in society to an undue influence 
and importance; against a system intended to 
benefit one description of citizens at the 
expense of every other class; against a 
system calculated to aggrandize and enrich 
some states to the injury of others; against 
a system, under every aspect, partial un- 13 
equal and unjust, we most solemnly protest. 
That the antipathy of South Carolina to the Tariff was in some 
measure just, there can be no doubt. For by the year 1830, 
the value attached to the export of the three staple goods of 
the South, cotton, rice and tobbacco, was far in excess of all 
other exports. Since the South had almost no manufacturing 
interests, she could not hope to benefit from a Tariff whose 
objective was to furnish protection to the manufacturing 
interests. The Tariff, then, was designed to close the 
American market to European manufactured articles, but in so 
doing, it also closed the European market to southern staple 
goods. This left the South dependent on the North for her 
market, a market totally inadequate to absorb so vast an influx 
12 Many who would have no part with Calhoun and his theory of 
Nullification were still firm in tl1eir conviction that the 
Tariff was responsible for their misery. 
13 H.C. Hockett, Constitutional History, MacMillan, 1939, 32. 
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. of produce.14 Previous to the Tariff, the South had received 
European manufactured goods in exhhange for her staple products 
but a high Tariff made this exchange impossible and so the 
south was forced to purchase the more costly porducts of 
northern industry.15 Thus, "one cannot wonder at southern 
antagonism to a protective system under which planters did the 
exporting, paid the import duty, and bought goods of northern 
make at a price artifically maintained by the Tariff. 16 
Yet, genuine as this grievance was, there were, as we have 
seen, other influences equallY as destructive as this one. The 
general tendency, however, was to disregard all else but the 
Tariff, and upon the Tariff alone was put the blame for all the 
misfortunes that had befallen South Carolina. Calmer heads, 
while willing to admit the unfairness of the Tariff, were able 
to see the unreality of laying all evils at its door. Hugh 
S. Legare, a prominent member of the South Carolina Legislature 
voiced this opinion, when he said, that tI ••• it is owing to this 
policy (of protection) that the Government had to bear the 
blame of whatever evils befall the people from natural or 
14 J.G. VanDeusen, Economic ~ases of Disunion in South Carolma 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1928, 3'5. 
15 Ibid., 32. 
16 McLaughlin, Constitutional History, 432. 
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a.ccidental causes •••• " In their eagerness to lay hold of a 
scapegoat, the first thought of the people was the Government. 
It was the Government's fault that southern costal lands were 
becoming barren and unproductive, that the price of cotton and 
other staple goods had fallen so sharply, that slave labor was 
not so profitable as it had been, and it was useless to attempt 
any alteration of southern public opinion on this point. But 
Legare, in spite of the public mind, was forced to admit, " ••• 
that there is no sort of connection (or an exceedingly slight 
one) between these unquestionable facts and the operation of 
the tariff law •••• "17 
As frequently happens in human affairs, more moderate 
opinions are "put by the boards," and those of a more violent 
nature adhered to. So it was in South Carolina. Calhoun's 
constituents were drifting towards disunion and he must 
follow after them or be lost politically. In their hatred for 
the Tariff, they would attack it as unconsitiutional, and 
Calhoun, taking up this attack, hesitatingly at first, in the 
end would become its greates leader and hero. 
\ 
This change in attitude, Which South Carolina was under-
going, was to be rendered more acceptable to Calhoun by reason 
of a turn in the fortunes of his own political career. If 
17 Frederick Bancroft, 24. 
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any man was fired with ambition, it was John C. Salhoun. This 
ambition which knew but one satisfaction, the Presidency or the 
United States, burned brightest in 1824, but ror the next 
twenty years it was to lie smouldering within him, never com-
pletely extinguished. Calhoun is orten misrepresented in his 
desire for the Presidency. By many he has been ~tyled a "poor 
loser." They say his failure to become Chief-Executive in 1824 
filled him with a maniacal passion to disrupt the Union. Had 
Calhoun gained the White House, perhaps he would never have 
suffered his nationalistic views to be altered, but this is no 
reason for saying that he changed them in defeat. The fact 
that his chances were less bright after 1824 only made him more 
prone to undertake the leadership of his constituents in their 
attack on the constitutionality of the Tariff. Deprived, as he 
was, for the moment of all chance for national honor, it was 
but natural that he turn to his home state and consider the 
situation. There he found that people were beginning to 
calcualte the value of the Union, as a matter of course, 
Calhoun, their representative, was drawn into calculation with 
them. But to say that all of Calhoun's waking hours arter his 
presidential rrustration in 1824 were spent in throwing acid 
on the chains of union, is a rarik injustice •. Ir Calhoun had 
been fully determined to destroy the Union after 1824, he might 
have made an open avowal of his anti-national views, thus se-
curing the solid backing of his home state. Instead, he 
~-------------------------------------------4-0~ 
concealed his authorship of the South Carolina Exposition till 
18)1, three years after it was written, and this in order to 
keep himself available should the national political scene 
again become favorable for him. 
Another factor that must have increased Calhoun's sense of 
disappointment and made his loss of the Presidency even more 
bitter, was his break with Andrew Jackson. Calhoun had joined 
Jackson's party after the election of 1824 in hope that he 
might become the heir apparent of the Jackson dybasty. This 
was an unnatural union, one that could not long endure, for 
Calhoun and Andrew Jackson were in all things save their 
common humanity, totally unlike. Jackson's crude, domineering 
habi ts could never have c.i1armed the cultured Calhoun. 
As if this natural disinclination was not enough to make a 
breech between the two, human agents took care that the ties of 
this expedient friendship should be burst asunder. Followers 
of Martin Van Buren were determined that he and not Calhoun 
should sit at Jackson's right hand in the kingdom that was 
coming. Calhoun himself ha0 incurred the presidential wrath 
by refusing the amenities to Peggy O'Neal ~aton, but this 
tempest subsided in time. 
There was a Sin, however, for which there was no forgive-
ness, and Calhoun had committed it. For years, since the 
IIS eminole Affair" had taken place, Jackson believed that 
calhoun, as Secretary of War in Adams' administration, saved 
bim from court martial. When Jackson had created an inter-
national crisis by invading Florida, cabinet ~embers began 
crying for his blood, and Jackson thought Calhoun had shielded 
bim from destruction at this time. For this reason he had come 
to favor the young man from South Carolina. But tlle time came 
when Calhoun seemed definitely to be outstripping Van Buren in 
the contest for presidential favor. It was at that moment 
that the truth of the Seminole incident was make known to 
Jackson. It was revealed that Calhoun had cried longer and 
louder than all the rest for the blood of Jackson. Because 
deceit shut up the bowels of the old man's mercy more tightly 
than anything else, and because Jackson felt that Calhoun had 
acted deceitfully in his regard, for these reasons, then, there 
was no longer a mansion for Calhoun in the kingdom of Jackson. 
With his fall from grace, Calhoun had either to return to 
South Carolina and enlist in the cause of state's rights, or 
retire to the life of a southern planter. The history of the 
United States for the next thirty years gives ample proof that 
Calhoun must have felt little desire to be with the "Old Folks 
at Home." The thought of Jackson vdth his authoritatian ways, 
and the unscrupulous politicians who sat in his kitchen, must 
have added ~est to the task which Calhoun undertook at this 
time. Thus, by 1831 Calhoun's presidential hopes were blotted 
out. If he was ever to realize his ambition, it would be with 
to resist the northern aggression. Just what this theory was 
with which he would oppose the North and which would produce 
forensic battles that rivaled Gettysburg in their fierceness, 
will form the next division of our study. 
CHAPTER IV 
CALHOUN'S POLITICAL THEORIES 
In reviewing John Calhoun's ideas on the Constitution up 
to the year 1832, it will be well, first of all, to say some-
thing of his approach to the whole matter. His approach. was a 
medicinal one. By this I would convey that Calhoun felt the 
United States Government was diseased, and in applying a 
remedy to this disease, he desired to use the instrL~ent at 
hand, the Constitution of the United States, for he felt that 
the disease had been brought on by a misuse of the instrument. 
He would effect a return to a balanced use, and so restore the 
diseased government to health. Calhounts strength lay in 
showing that his was the orthodox teaching demanded by the Con-
stitution. Those who opposed him, he contended, were not in 
harmony with the Constitution. If his opponents were allowed 
to prevail, the result would ruin the Union. What Calhoun him-
self proposed was really a means, he said, of insuring the con-
tinuance of this Union. "To preserve our Union on the fair 
basis of equality, on which alone it can stand, and to transmit 
the blessings of liberty to the remotest posterity is the first 
object of all my exertions."l 
1 H. Von Holst, John C. Calhoun, 168. 
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rr That this was a wise course there can be no doubt. Had i 
he preached his doctrine as something revolutionary, it is quite 
conceivable that Andrew Jackson, in fulfillment of his threat, 
would have caused Calhoun to hang as a rebel. More than 
likely, however, Jackson would have been preceded in this 
action,for the people themselves would have disposed of Calho~ 
had he posed as an enemy of the Constitution. The people had 
long since lost all aversion to the Constitution; they no longer 
believed that it was a make shift affair, Ita patchwork of com-
promise." The Fathers of the Constitution were considered by 
them "as an isolated historical phenomenon of purity of motive 
and political wisdom. 1t2 In American minds the Constitution 
had taken on a sacredness that only the Bible could rival. 
"Whoever desired their favor dared not touch the idol of 
theirs, and could scarcely ignore it unpunished.,,3 
Calhoun, then, respecting this popular predilection, was 
careful to paint a picture that gave prominence to the Con-
stitution. The immediate occasion of Calhoun'S struggle was 
the Tariff, which he portrayed as an instrument of oppression. 
In defiance of the Constitution, it did harm to the weak in 
the interests of the strong. The North, Calhoun charged, was 
2 Von Holst, Constitutional History, 70. 
3 Ibid., 75. 
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using the Tariff to strip the South of the blessings bestowed 
upon her by nature and was converting these blessings to her 
own advantage. 
If the people allowed this desecration of the Constitu-
tion to continue, Calhoun prophesied the destruction of all 
their political liberty. The very essence of liberty de-
manded that those who exercised power be made to feel the 
burden of their responsibility. It was unthinkable to him 
that the Constitution had provided no safeguard against this 
oppression of the weak by the strong. For, "no government 
based on the naked principle that the majority ought to 
govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense, and under 
proper restriction, can preserve its liberty even for a Single 
generation."4 To show just what safeguard the Constitution 
had provided, was the task to which Calhoun, with perhaps the 
keenest and subtlest mind since Alexander Hamilton, devoted 
himself. CalhOun was a master logician and with his superb 
power of argumentation, by beginning with a few seemingly 
innocuous assumptions, he was able to construct a theory of 
government which few of his time could even comprehend, much 
less refute. 
4 Calhoun, Works, VI, 33. 
~-' ---------------------------------~--' 
Because Calhoun was building his edifice--we had almost 
said his house of cards---upon a Constitutional basis-albeit 
a basis formed by his own particular conception of that Con-
stitution--we must first turn to Calhoun's ideas on the origin 
of the Constitution.5 As a prelude to his views on the Con-
stitution's origin, Calhoun deemed it of the utmost importance 
to determine "who are the real authors of the Constitution of 
the United States--whose power created it-whose voice clothed 
it with authority; and whose agent the government it formed 
really is."6 
This que~tion concerning the true authorship of the Con-
stitution had fostered widespread confusion in the American 
political mind. No one, Calhoun averred, seems to be really 
certain who it was that made the Constitution. Calhoun traced 
much of this confusion to a lack of consistency in the use of 
two very important words. In general, Calhoun believed people 
had failed to make any qualifications when they said the 
5 
6 
It is not absolutely necessary to make this our first con-
sideration. Calhoun's doctrines are set do~vn in his works 
without particular attention to logical sequence. This was 
often unnecessary because of the purpose or audience for 
which a particular speech was intended. Here we will have 
to invent a sequence for the sake of clarity and order. 
Calhoun, Works, 145. 
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constitution was made by the "States," or when they said it 
was made by the "people. 1I To Calhoun a state coul mean either 
the government or the state, or its people, regarded as 
rorming a separate and independent community. Also the people 
could denote " ••• either the American people taken collectively 
as rorming one great community, or as the people or the 
several States, rorming, as above stated, separate and inde-
pendent communitites. n7 
Upon the proper understanding or these words the whole 
rorce or Calhoun's argument hinges. For ir by the word 
"people," we understand the American people taken collectively, 
and assert that they were responsible ror the ratirication or 
the Constitution, then Calhoun is rinished. An individual 
state would have as much right to 9Ppose the Tarirr Laws or 
the United States Government, as a country has to undermine 
the authority or another country. He himselr admits that, 
"viewing the American people collectively as a source or 
political power, the rights or States would be mere con-
cessions-concessions rrom the common majority, and to be re-
vOked by them with the same racility that they were granted. u8 
Calhoun, however, would never admit that such was the 
case. The Constitution was not, could not be said to have 
7 Ibid., 147. 
8 Ibid., 148. 
l 
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been empowered by a grant of the American people taken collec-
tively. In fact, he said, "so far from the Constitution being 
the work of the American people collectively, no such pelitl-
body now exists or ever did exist."9 To Calhoun's mind, the 
people of the United States had never acted in a body, but 
always as members of distinct political communities. When 
under Britain, they were distinct colonies. In declaring 
themselves no longer bound to the Mother Country, they de-
sired henceforward to be recognized by all men as free and 
independent states. Later, the Constitution was submitted for 
ratification to each individual state, and as each state 
accepted the new instrument, it thereby bound its own citizens. 
Hence he felt the conclusion inevitable that, 
••• the Constitution is the work of the people 
of the states considered as separate and in-
dependent political communities; that they 
are its authors-their power created it, their 
voice clothed it with authority; that the 
government formed is, in reality, their agent; 
and that the Union, of which the Constitution 
is the bond, is a union of states, and not of 
individuals. 10 
In Calhoun'S system certain important results follow 
immediately upon this conclusion. He views the relation be-
tween the General Government and the people as qeing made 
possible by the action of the state. Without the ratification 
9 Ibid., 147. 
10 Ibid., 148. 
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of their state, the people of that state would never have come 
under the control of the General Government; as regards the 
General Government they would bear the same relation as do 
citizens of a foreign country. This means, Calhoun continued, 
that the act of ratification binds the state as a community 
and not the citizens as individuals. It was to Calhoun the 
most elementary logic to declare that, since the state was 
instrumental in putting its citizens under obligation to the 
General Government, it has also the right to declare to its 
citizens the extent of this obligation. This declaration by 
the state of the extent of its obligation to the General Gov-
ernment would, Calhoun concluded, be binding on the people. 
This, then, was Calhoun's response to the important 
question concerning the ratification of the Constitution. We 
are now ready to make a closer examination of the system of 
government which Calhoun deemed the Constitution had author-
ized. Since, as we have seen, he held that individual states 
were not bound by the Constitution till they themselves 
wished it, Calhoun could rightfully describe the-stat$ as 
as acting in their sovereign capacities, that is, they 
possessed the power of complete self determination and they 
exercised this power in ratifying the Constitution. By re-
calling the attitude taken by the various states in ratifying 
the Constitution, Calhoun asserted that the states had no 
rr=lntention of relinquishing this power of self determination, 
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their sovereignty. He denied that by their act of ratifi-
cation the states united themselves into a single political 
body, which then became the possessor of the sovereignt¥ 
formerly possessed by the states. For, II, ••• frow the beginning 
and in all the changes of political existence through which 
we have passed, the people of the United States have been 
united as forming political communities, and not as indi-
viduals."ll Because the states acted separately in ratifying 
the Constitution, the product of this separate action is to 
Calhoun merely an agreement between the states. Their action 
as separate states in setting up a central government did not 
destroy their existence as separate sovereignties. 
With admirable foresight, Calhoun perceived that some, 
while admitting his position on the retention of sovereignty 
by the states after ratification, would, never the less, main-
tain that the states actually delivered up a portion of this 
sovereignty to the new government. But to Calhoun such an 
opinion was utter nonsense, for he believed in an undivided 
sovereignty, and that 
to separate sovereignty is to destroy it; 
sovereignty must be one, or it is not at 
all. There can be no state partly sovereign 
and partly non-sovereign; there can be no 
association composed of half sovereign 
states on the one hand and a half sovereign 
11 Ibid., VI, 147. 
government on the other. The vital prin-
ciple of the state, its life and spirit, 
cannot be sundered; it must remain one 
and indivisible. All compromise is re-
jected, and the doctrine of the indi-
visibility of sovereignty is presented 
in its clearest and most striking light. 12 
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In Calhoun's eyes, those who contended for a division of 
sovereignty were thoroughly deluded. They had failed to dis-
tinguish between the actual possession of sovereignty and the 
exercise of a grant of sovereign power. Were it~ue that a 
division of sovereignty had taken place, the states would be 
degraded " ••• from the high and sovereign condition which they 
have held under every form of their existence, to be mere sub-
ordinate and dependent corporations of the Government of their 
own creation. lt13 Calhoun would readily admit that a sovereign 
may apportion his power to as many agents as he sees fit and 
with any limitations that he deems necessary, but for him 
" ••• to surrender any portion of his sovereignty to another is 
to annihilate the whole."14 
That the General Government established by the Constitu-
tion has exercised certain powers, Calhoun never for a minute 
doubted. However, by reason of the indivisibility of 
12 C.E. Merriam, ~ Political Philosophy of John C. Calhoun, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1914, 331. 
Calhoun, Works, VI, 154. 
Ibid., II, 232. 
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sovereignty, to which Calhoun had given his placet, the General 
Government does not share in the so~ereignty possessed by 
the states. Sovereignty resided in the states alone, but the 
Constitution, which the states ratified, bestows certain 
enumerated powers upon the General Government, and all powers 
not so granted are reserved to the states. What, then, is 
the relation between state and General Government in Calhoun's 
system? Broadly speaking, Calhoun thought it correct to con-
ceive of the General Goverenment as, 
••• the agent of the states, constituted to 
excecute their joint will, as expressed in 
the constitution •••• It (the General Govern-
ment) is as truly and properly a govern-
ment as are the State governments them-
selves •••• Indeed according to our theory, 
governments are in their nature but trusts, 
and those appointed to administer them, 
trustees or agents to execute trust powers. 15 
Since the General Government is the agent of the States, 
Calhoun would not allow that the Government could exercise 
and maintain a power which any of the states might see fit to 
dispute. He denied the existence of any contract in human 
life, in which the agent has the right to enforce his con-
tention against the veto of one of the contracting parties. 
In the case under dispute, the General Government is the joint 
agent of the twenty four sovereign states. In the light of 
the principle already asserted by Calhoun, nothing could be 
15 Ibid., VI, 151. 
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clearer, than that the General Government must never be per-
mitted to contest the possession or a power with the states. 
This would have been, in erfect, to rly in the race or right 
reason. No, where there is contest over the exercise or a 
power between agent and principle, between the General Govern-
ment and the States, Calhoun would have the Government sub-
mit the question to the decision or the states, and then, if 
the states see rit, they may grant the power in question to 
the General Government. Calhoun conceived this right which 
the states have to judge in a contest over power, as an 
essential attribute or sovereignty. Ir this right were de-
nied the states, they would be seprived or sovereignty itseln 
In fact, to divide power, and to give to 
one of the parties the exclusive right 
or judging of the portion alloted to 
each, is, in reality, not to divide at 
all; and to reserve such exclusive right 
to the General Government (it matters 
not by what department it is to be exer-
cised,) is to convert it, in fact, into 
a great consolidated government with un-
limited powers, and to divest the6states, in reality, or all their rights. l 
Calhoun was aware that some might be troubled by the 
apparent debilitation state sovereignty works upon the 
General Govermnent. Ir the General Government must lay its 
claim to power berore the judgment seat ~r the states, what 
16 Ibid., VI, 46. 
would become of the Union? Calhoun was quick to calm these 
timid souls and chided them for their lack of faith in the 
Constitution. The delicate system of checks and balances 
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which is our Constitution has provided against this danger by 
means of the amending power. 
Each state, by assenting to the Constitution 
••• has modified its original right as a 
sovereign, of making its individual consent 
necessary to any change in its political 
condition; and, by becoming a member of the 
Union, has placed this important power in17 the hands of three fourths of the states. 
Without this modification in state authority the above men-
tioned danger might well have assumed alarming proportions. 
But by reason of this modification, it was no longer possible 
for a single state effectively to checkmate the action of the 
General Government. The amending power really prevents this 
danger. In virtue of the provisions which it contains, the 
decision of a state concerning power disputed with the General 
Government will not be effective, unless the state be sus-
tained by one fourth of its co-states. 18 
And yet, in spite of this assurance, Calhoun knew that 
many would still doubt the efficacy of the runending power to 
protect the General Government. They would say that according 
17 Ibid., VI, 37.· 
18 Ibid., VI, 175. 
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to this provision, one more than one fourth of the states may 
now work all the mischief that was formerly worked by one 
state with its 1I 0riginal right as sovereign." There would be 
a very real danger, that under the alYiending power so stated 
this very small minority of the states will not only be able 
to prevent the General Government from receiving the grant of 
additional powers, but also that right of amendment " ••• may 
be abused, and, thereby, powers be resumed which were, in fact, 
delegated; and it is also true, if sustained by one fourth of 
the co-states, such resumption may be successfully and per-
manently made by the States. 1I19 Calhoun was able to reduce 
this objection to very simple elements. So reduced, it be-
comes a question as to the lesser of two evils. Without this 
ability of one more than one fourth of the states to hold down 
effectively the natural tendency of the General Government to 
assume more power, state sovereignty would be a mere chimera; 
on the other hand, as we noted above, the states may abuse 
this power and completely denude the Central Government of the 
last vestige of its delegated power. Through recourse to 
what he had' already laid down as the fundamental principle 
of our governmental s;Tstem, Calhoun did not despair of 
adequately cushioning at least one horn of this dillema. 
Though presently modified, he announced the fundamental 
19 Ibid., VI, 177. 
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principle in our system to be that original power which the 
states possessed to govern themselves completely. Accordingly, 
a single state, at its own disgression, might withhold a 
power from the General Government. Arguing in the light of 
this principle, Calhoun preferred that the states resume powers 
which they had already delegated, than that the General Govern-
ment usurp powers which had never been intended~r its use. 
IIFor in the later case the usurpation would be against the 
fundamental principle of our system-the original right of the 
states to self government-; while in the former, if it be 
usurpation at all, it would be, if so bold an expression may 
be used, a usurpation in the spirit of the Constitution it-
self."20 
Before we go on to consider another point in the Consti-
tutional system advocated by Calhoun, let us, briefly, review 
what we have already seen. At the outset, Calhoun endeavored 
to establish the Constitution as the work of the people of 
the individual states. Each state by its acts of ratification 
bound itself, so to speak, to the Constitution and this act 
Calhoun viewed as an exercise of sovereignty on the part of 
the state. By analyzing Revolutionary History, Calhoun reached 
the conclusion that the ratifying states did not intend to 
deliver up this ability to exercise their sovereignty to the 
20 Ibid., VI, 177. 
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Government of the Constitution. Since they did not deliver up 
this sovereignty, they retained all of it, because sovereignty 
in Calhoun's system was something that would admit of no 
division. This retention of sovereignty on the part of each 
individual state made the established General Government the 
agent of the States, and agent which had been allowed the 
exercise of certain powers by the sovereign states. In order 
to prevent the agent Government from becoming a useless puppet, 
subject to the whim of any of the sovereign states, the amend-
ing power was introduced. As Calhoun expounded it, the 
amending power enabled three fourths of the states to uphold 
the agent Government in a dispute with a single state. How-
ever, this amending power, as Calhoun proceeded to illustrate, 
has another phase, in which a state that seCl~es the consent 
of one more than one fourth of the states, may successfully 
encounter the agent Government. By so doing, it cannot only 
prevent the agent from receiving new powers, but could also 
deprive it of old ones. This, to Calhoun, was the lesser of 
two evils. It appeared better to him and more in keeping with 
the original conception of the Constitutional system, that 
the states should harass the agent which they first empowered, 
than that the agent should be able to turn and ravage them. 
To this point we have watched the development of Calhoun's 
system along positive lines. Now we may note some change in 
his manner of attack. In order to bring out in bolder relief 
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an important point of his own doctrine, Calhoun adopts a nega-
tive approach and brands as false a common pol:itical opinion 
of the day. 
It was commonly held in Calhoun's day that the most 
fundamental principle of constitutional govermnent was that 
of majority rule. Its importance was judged to eclipse the 
very sovereignty of the states themselves. In fact, the right 
of a state to resist an attack on its sovereignty was con-
sidered inconsistent with the principle of majority rule. 
We gain the impression from what he said that Calhoun had 
a very low estimate of public opinion in this matter, for he 
charged that 1I ••• 0f all the impediments opposed to a just con-
ception of the nature of our political system ••• this is the 
greates. U 
In order to remove this im::)ediment, Calhoun first brings 
forth a clear statement of the meaning which he attached to 
the phrase "ma.jority rule. 1I It is not, as many believe, a 
principle too simple to admit of a.ny distinction, but rather, 
it is a 
••• principle susceptible of the most impor-
tant distinction-entering deeply into the 
construction of our system, and, I ma:! add, 
into that of all free states in proportion 
to the perfection of their institutions-and 
is essential to the very existence of liberty.21 
21 Ibid., VI, 181. 
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Calhoun arrived at this distinction by asserting that 
there were two modes of estimating the majority. By one mode, 
" ••• the whole community is regarded in the aggregate, and the 
majority is estimated in reference to the entire mass." 22 To 
this Calhoun affixed the name "absolute majority.1I What, then, 
was Calhoun's second way of determining the majority? The 
majority, he declared, may also be estimated by considering 
separately each interest of the community, 
••• whichmay be unequally and injuriously 
affected by the action of the government, 
separately, through its own majority, or 
in some other way, by which its voice may 
be fairly expressed; and to require the 
consent of each interest, either to put 
or to keep the government in action. 23 
The will of the majority in such a system is reached through 
the concurrence of all the variant interestes. The majority 
so estimated is called the concurrent majority. 
Calhoun saw the government which the people of the 
sovereign states erected as resting upon the firm foundation 
of the concurring majority. But to Calhoun the marvelous 
fact about the Government of the United states was not so 
much that it was founded on the principle of the concurrent 
majority, but that it had been able to combine in an ad-
mirable harmony both the absolute and the concurrent majoritie~ 
22 Ibid., VI, 181. 
23 Ibid., I, 25. 
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In order to decide what powers ought to be granted and how the 
Government (the law-making and the law-administering powers) 
which executes the~e powers ought to be organized, Calhoun 
held that, " ••• the separate and concurring voice of the States 
was required-the union being regarded, for the purpose, in 
reference to its various and distinct interests."24 Calhoun 
saw clearly, however, that in regard to the execution of the 
powers of government the principle of the absolute majority 
had been introduced. ffThe Union,1I he said, "is no longer re-
garded in reference to all its parts, but as forming, to the 
extent of its delegated powers one great community-to be 
governed by a common will •••• "25 In this way Calhoun felt 
the first Fathers made use of the good points in both the 
absolute and concurrent majorities. The absolute majority 
gives energy and dispatch to the Government in the exercise 
of its powers, while the concurrent majority assures the 
people of the various groups in the community (from whom the 
power to rule actually comes) a vigorous share in the Govern-
mente 
The delicate balance between the concurrent and absolute 
majorities was, indeed, for Calhoun, the heart of the American 
constitutional system. 
24 Ibid~, VI, 185. 
25 Ibid., VI, 185. 
To work for the destruction of this 
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balance, would be to crush out the political life that had so 
marvelously prospered since the days of its inception at the 
Constitutional Convention. To insure the preservance of this 
balance, Calhoun advised that the fundamental principle of the 
system be retained. No one, then, was to forget that his 
Government was founded and empowered by the concurring majority. 
The combination of this majority with the absolute majority, 
Calhoun reminds us, was a measure of expediency to facilitate 
the operation of the Government. liThe ascendency of the con-
stitution-making authority over the law-making-the concurring 
over the absolute majority ••• " must be maintained, unless 
harmony be destroyed and discord and oppression replace it. 26 
The problem which next confronted Calhoun was, how to 
maintain this ascendency once it had been established. In 
part the question had already been answered. We have seen, 
that in Calhoun's opinion the law making authority was freed 
from comalete subordination to the individual states by the 
amending power. Three fourths of the states were enabled to 
uphold the law making authority, brought into existence, 
remember, by the separate consent of each state to the 
Constitution, against the enactments of a single state. Lest 
the law making authority over-reach itself, one more than 
one fourth of the states might still completely control the 
26 Ibid., VI, 186. 
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actions of the law making authority. In this manner, Calhoun 
assures us, the passage to the direct acquisition of power by 
the law making or absolute majority was most carefully guarded. 
II But ,tt Calhoun tells us, "it would have been folly in the 
extreme thus carefully to guard the passage to the direct 
acquisition, (of power)" had the wide door of construction been 
left open to its direct (acquisition.) 1127 To guard the door 
of construction and indirect acquisition of power, Calhoun 
demanded for the states the right of interposition or 
nullification, and he expressed the belief that this right was 
indispensable to prevent the more energetic 
but imperfect majority which controls the 
movements of the Government from usurping 
the place of that more perfect and jU8t 
majority which formed the Constitution and28 ordained Government to execute its powers. 
Further, Oalhoun continues, the right of nullification is 
an attribute of every sovereign state, and the state cannot 
give over to another authority outside itself the power of 
setting limi ts to its sovereignty. To do this, Calhoun I'easons, 
would be tantamount to delivering up sovereignty itself. 
Vihat, from Calhoun's point of view, the states actually had 
done, was to share certain powers with the General Government, 
while retaining complete sovereignty within themselves. And 
27 Ibid., 189. 
28 Ibid., 186. 
thus the states alone should have the " ••• right of deciding 
on the infractions of their powers and the proper remedy to 
be applied for their correction."29 In order to decide 
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whether the General Government has transgressed in assuming a 
certain power, Oalhoun would have the dissenting state meet 
in a special convention. 
When convened, it will belong to the Con-
vention itself to determine authorita-
tively, whether the acts of which we com-
plain (Calhoun is here speaking of the 
Tariff) be unconstitutional; and if so, 
whether they constitute a violation so 
deliberate, palpable and dangerous, as 
to justify the interposition of the state 
to protect its rights.30 
If the Convention should decide against the General Govern-
ment, Calhoun concluded with irresistible logic, that the 
power assumed by the Government should have no effect within 
that state. The General Government would then be faced with 
the alternative of relinquishing all claim to the disputed 
power, or of securing the power directly through an amend-
ment to the Constitution. Calhoun had based this decision 
to nullify an act of the General Government on the particular 
state's rights as amember of the Union. And hence he felt 
free to dictate that the act of nullification would be 
" ••• obligatory not only on her own citizens, but on the 
General Government, itself; and thus places the violated 
29 Ibid., VI, 41. 
30 Ibid., VI, 45. 
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rights of the States under the shield of the Constitution. fl 31 
Calhoun next proceeds to sketch the results which 
nullification would produce. One result of nullification 
would be to make the General Government extremely cautious in 
the use of doubtful powers. Careful consideration for the 
probable reaction of a state to a certain measure would be-
come inherent in the General Government. Calhoun could be-
hold in nullification a feeling of conscious security for the 
states and this, added to the moderation and kindness, which 
nullification would tend to produce in the General Govern-
ment, would, he felt, fI ••• effectually put down animosity, 
and thus give scope to the natural attachment to our insti-
tutions, to expand and grow into the full maturity of 
patriotism. u 32 
Calhoun refused to concede that nullification might be-
come the result of momentary hysteria in a state. The delay 
in assembling a convention, the extraordinary nature of the 
convention itself, the great number of those concerned, all 
these, he felt, would militate against undue haste. Also, 
the nullifying state would have to consider the attitude of 
the other states. Should her action be purely sectional and 
31 Ibid., VI, 45. 
32 Ibid., VI, 49. 
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selfish, Calhoun relied on the strong force of public opinion, 
which would be brought against her, to provide an effective 
deterrent. As another safeguard, Calhoun had recourse to the 
political minorities within the states themselves, which 
would make the irresponsible use of nullification extremely 
difficult. So powerful, he concluded, tI ••• are these diffi-
culties that nothing but truth and a deep sense of oppression 
on the part of the people of the State, will ever sustain 
the exercise of the power •••• "33 
Calhoun was careful to propound nullification as an 
assertion of moral force and not of military force. He pic-
tured the sovereign state as merely exercising its lawful 
prerogative by invoking nullification. Granting his conten-
tion that the state was sovereign, then, of course, the 
Government could not legally enforce the nullified act within 
the limits of that state. By the use of military force, the 
Government would truly be acting in defiance of the Consti-
tution. Actually, as Calhoun grasped the situation, there 
would be no one against whom the Government might invoke 
force. Force could only be used where there was resistance 
to law, and surely, no one would call the refusal of a court 
within a sovereign state to exact a find, or the failure of 
state courts to render judgment in conformity with the wishes 
33 ~., 48. 
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or the General Government, resistance to the law. There was, 
then, 
••• no insurrection to suppress; no armed 
rorce to reduce; not a sword unsheathed; 
not a bayonet raised; none, absolutely 
none, on whome force could be used, ex-
cept it be on the unarmed citizens en-
gaged peacerully a~ quietly in their 
daily occupations.~ 
This idea of peaceful nullification was typical or 
Calhoun. It was the point he must get across, ir he was to 
win a hearing ror his doctrine. Always, he was at pains to 
stress the fact that he was adhering to the Constitution. In 
all the points or Calhoun's doctrine treated in this chapter, 
the idea or constitutionality, or legality, has been basic. 
Without this note or propriety, or conrormity to established 
tradition, Calhoun's cause would have been hopelessly lost. 
Those who did not share his opinions were, he maintained, ob-
viously subverting the Constitution. His way was calculated 
to save the Constitution. He began, we saw, by asserting 
that each state possessed undivided sovereignty. None or this 
sovereignty had been transferred to the General Government. 
In order to insure the sarety and well being or this 
sovereign power, Calhoun advances the idea or the concurrent 
majority. This concurrent majority is designed to prevent an 
oppression or the minority by the majority. Without some 
34 l!?.!J!., VI, 164. 
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method of enforcement, however, the use of the concurrent 
majority could not be depended on to conserve minority interesta 
Nullification was the weapon by which the theory of the con-
current majority could be put into operation effectively. 
These, then, are the key points of John C. Calhoun's political 
theories. The note of observance for the law, of reverence 
for the Constitution formed the setting, as it were, in which 
these doctrines were presented to the American people. Thus 
briefly having reviewed the basic political tenets of John 
Calhoun, we turn to the task of presenting an evaluation of 
his ideas. 
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CHAPTER V 
A CRITICAL STUDY OF CALHOUN'S THEORY 
In this chapter, a critique or Calhoun's doctrines, no 
claim is made to finality. The discussion which John Calhoun 
began still continues in certain respects. Untill the time of 
Abraham Lincoln, no one gave a convincing answer to the prob-
lem proposed by Calhoun. And Lincoln gave his answer not in 
the halls of Congress but through northern artillery at 
Vicksburg, at Shiloe and berore Richmond. So, however con-
vincing and conclusive in the physical order his arguments 
may have been, they need not be so in the intellectual. It 
would, then be presumptuous ror us to attempt to settle 
definitively a question which has plagued even great minds. 
We can only criticize Calhoun in the light of the authorities 
at our disposal. On some points, perhaps, we may endeavor 
to strike out on our own, but never with the idea that 
Calhoun is writhingunder the inescapable blows or our logic. 
We feel it will be sufficient to point out some of the places 
where Calhoun's arguments might be impunged. That there are 
a number of such places, I feel sure, because, however much 
Calhoun maintained the correctness of his theories, no evi-
dence was put forward, either by him or anyone else, to prove 
his writings inspired! 
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Fundamental to all Calhoun's thinking was the idea of 
sovereignty. He believed that· the Colonies from the very 
beginning had been distinct political entities. From that 
time forward, he held they retained this separate identity. 
There never was a time when they acted in any other character. 
In breaking away from England they asserted their individual 
sovereignty and at no time thereafter did they suffer the loss 
of even the slightest measure of this sovereignty. By ex-
amining the significance of the word "sovereignty" we may at 
least cast some doubt upon the correctness of Calhoun's 
position. 
First, what is the common meaning attached to the word 
It sovereignty?" It is looked upon as the !l ••• supreme absolute 
and uncontrollable power by which any independent state is 
governed. III This is certainly the sense in which Calhoun 
oftentimes used the word. He speaks repeatedly of the 
sovereign states having the tlabsolute and uncontrollable 
power" in regard to the ratification of the Constitution. 
Since Calhoun also maintained the indivisibility of 
sovereignty, we may be sure that a state which was sovereign 
in respect to ratification would be sovereign in every other 
regard. 
1 Thomas M. Colley, Principles of Constitutional Law, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston, l89TI, 16. 
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Certain facts, however, can be brought forward which ren-
der Calhoun's position extremely weak, for these seem to in-
dicate that the states were never really possessed of that 
sovereignty which Calhoun claimed for them. It is true enough, 
that the earliest official documents of our country refer to 
the states as sovereign. "But they were always, in respect 
to some of the higher powers of sovereignty, subject to the 
control of some common authority, and were never really 
recognized or known as members of the family of nations. 1I2 
Later, when the Colonists revolted, they were subject in some 
measure at least to the Revolutionary Congress, and with the 
formation of the Articles of Confederation, the Congress of 
the Confederation held power over the states. Finally under 
our present Constitution, the National Government is designed 
to control the states. Though the powers of these several 
bodies over the states differed greatly, there was still one 
point of control which they all exercised, namely, no colony 
or state under the four governments ever had the right to 
make war or to carryon commercial or political intercourse 
with a foreign nation. This phase of political life was 
always cared for by a body outside the colony or state itself, 
the sole exception being North Carolina and Rhode Island, who 
by failing to ratify the Constitution, took on the status of 
2 ~., 16. 
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foreign nations. But so short lived was their existence in 
this fashion, that their sovereignty was neither asserted by 
them, nor recognized by foreign countries. 
As is evident, conclusive proof that the states were 
never completely sovereign would tend greatly to dissipate 
the force of Calhoun's argument. For if the states were not 
sovereign before they ratified the Constitution, there seems 
little ground for asserting that ratification made them so. 
It is doubtful, though, that conclusive proof could be fur-
ni1shed. Could it not always be argued that the original 
colonies, or later the states, refrained from war or foreign 
agreements merely for the sake of expediency; that they really 
possessed the sovereign power necessary to do so, but thought 
it wiser to refrain from its use? 
Another point upon which Calhoun's doctrine is not 
universally accepted, is his theory of undivided sovereignty. 
Just as the sovereignty of the states before ratification is 
essential to Calhoun's theory, so the principle of undivided 
sovereignty must be held in order to support his theory after 
the states actually did ratify the Constitution. For it would 
be just as fatal to his argument to prove that the states 
could give over a part of their sovereignty in ratifying the 
Constitution, as it would to prove that the states before 
ratification were never really sovereign states. 
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As we have seen, the necessity of an indivisible 
sovereignty is vital to Calhoun's theory of government. Be-
cause sovereignty cannot be divided, the states never lost 
the power of sovereign action. When they accepted the Con-
stitution, Calhoun saw the state as merely making an agreement 
which bound them only as long as they cared to be bound. In 
the event that one of the states felt it was being unfairly 
treated by the General Government, it could in full justice 
interpose its sovereignty and so prevent any further action 
on the part of the Government. This, of course, is the pro-
cess of nullification, which we presented in the previous 
chapter. The cornerstone of this system of nullification 
which Calhoun erected was the indivisibility of sovereignty. 
It made impossible the formation of any new body with power 
above that of the individual states, which could effectively 
hold the states to the agreement which they had made. As 
far as the states were concerned, there was no sufficient 
reaSon why they should be bound fast to the agreement which 
they had made. They could only be bound by a superior power, 
but since they still possessed complete and undivided 
sovereignty, where was there a power superior to them? 
At this point it may be useful to indulge in a little 
theorizing. I see no reason why we cannot apply the test of 
the "adequate conceptI! to the notion of sovereignty. It 
14 
seems unthinkable that this dry bone of metaphysics could be 
resurrected and made to be of some service, but perhaps it 
can be. 
As a rule, by adequate concept we mean one which is 
essentially and completely determined in itself and contains 
characteristics of no~her concept.3 Calhoun maintained all 
along that while retaining sovereignty, the states delegate 
certain powers which they possess in virtue of this sovereignty. 
Now the question becomes, just what is contained under the 
adequate concept of sovereignty? We answer from our experience. 
When we speak of a state or a government being sovereign, we 
intend to convey that it has perfect freedom of action. In 
the language of our Constitution, sovereignty means the ability 
to make war, execute treaties, levy duties, raise taxes, and, 
in general, promote the common welfare. These, remember, are 
the delegated powers of which Calhoun speaks, and they are 
what constitute sovereignty in the fullest sense of the word. 
They are the concrete expression of the abstract idea of 
sovereignty. Without one of these constitutive powers the 
idea of sovereignty is stripped of its full meaning. Since 
we know for sure that the Gove.r:nment does possess the exercise 
of certain of these powers, we must say that the Government 
3 T.P. Byrne, Metaphysica Generalis, Collegium Badense 
Occidentale, 1943, 29. 
sovereign power, because the states retain teose powers not 
expressly delegated, the General Government is only partially 
sovereign. And since the states too possess sovereign power, 
they, like the General Government, are partially sovereign. 
Thus our argument based on the adequate concept leads us to 
contradict Calhoun when he asserts the indivisibility of 
sovereignty. Once some of the constitutive elements of 
sovereignty have been relinquished, complete sovereignty no 
longer exists. As we know too, the states have given over 
certain powers of action to the General Government, so we 
must admit that the states no longer possess absolute 
sovereignty. In effect, sovereignty has been divided. The 
states now possess an incomplete sovereignty; the General 
Government now possesses an incomplete sovereignty. 
As to the exact worth of the argument just proposed, it 
would be difficult to say. In view of the fact that it is 
not an argument commonly invoked it would be extremely rash 
to claim for it any great measure of finality or conclusive-
ness. It is, in the last analysis, pretty much a matter of the 
interpretation one chooses to place upon the word II sovereignty." 
Since the meaning of this word is subject to alteration by 
reason of time and circumstance, any argument based on its 
meaning cannot be entirely satisfying. 
One thing, however, we may note with rull certainty con-
cerning Calhoun's doctrine on the indivisibility or 
sovereignty: It was not a doctrine commonly held at the time 
the Constitution was written. True, there are some things 
wbichwere said in the Constitutional Convention that are not 
inconsistent with the idea or an undivided sovereignty. But 
in an overall consideration of the Convention, one cannot es-
cape the notion that its members were of the mind " ••• that 
compelling legal authority was to be exercised within given 
fields; one field was to belong to the national governemnt, 
one to the states."4 
This fact, we believe, renders Calhoun's position ex-
tremely precarious. He was imposing an interpretation upon 
the Constitution, which its authors had never intended it 
to bear. Is this procedure just? It seems only fair that 
a document should be studied by the light or the ideas in 
which it was written. Madison, too, evidently felt the un-
fairness of Calhoun's position when he wrote in the cloSing 
years of his life to defend opinions expressed many years 
before. Madison remarks that hitherto sovereignty had always 
been considered a thing capable of division. In fact, he 
says, as the " ••• in their highest sovereign character were 
competent to surrender the whole sovereignty and form them-
4 McLaughlin, Constitutional History of the United States,lJ). 
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selves into a consolidated state, so they might surrende~ a 
part and retain, as they have done, the other part." However, 
since the time or the Convention, Madison continues, anothe~ 
theory on the nature of sovereignty had come into vogue. Th1s 
theory holds that sovereignty is indivisible, and that con-
sequently the states when they rormed the constitutional com-
pact were incapable of delivering up any portion of this 
sovereignty. For this reason, then, the states today are as 
absolutely sovereign as they were before they undertook to 
ratify the Constitution. uIn settling the claim between these 
rival claims or power,fI Madison thought it proper, lito keep 
in mind that all power is derived from compact in a just and 
free government.tlS 
These last words of Madison suggest what was perhaps the 
chier difficulty underlying the whole Calhoun controversy. 
Calhoun based his argument on a philosophy of government 
which was little known in 1787. By Oalhoun's time the com-
pact theory of John Locke had begun to lose its preeminence, 
and a new theory had ga~ned ravor. Calhoun was in this re-
spect a child of his times. He followed the new doctrine 
and allowed the compact theory to fall into disuse. Whether 
Calhoun was perrectly conscious of the new course his politi-
5 A.C. McLaughlin, The Courts, the Constitution ~ Parties, 
The University or Chicago Press, Chicago, 1912, 229. 
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cal theory was following, is debatable. His works show traces 
of both theories, and this makes an exact appraisal of his 
opinions difficult; but on the whole, it can be said that 
Calhoun was following a philosophy which rose from nineteenth 
century civilization and which " ••• was first decisively 
manifested in Hegel and given full expression by the more 
modern political philosophers •••• "6 
In order to see how thoroughly Calhoun had departed from 
Revolutionary thought, it will be well to review the main 
ideas which held sway at the Constitutional Convention. Fore-
most among the political tenets of the time, was the belief 
that the right to govern came from the consent of the governed. 
People could, by giving their consent, erect a permanent form 
of government. It was believed that the people could, their 
oonsent having been given, form themselves into a single 
political body. Disparate groups, then, could by their own 
consent combine into a political unit. There was no need of 
a higher force to bind men, for, by giving consent, they could 
bind themselves. Laws, though they did not emanate from a 
higher authority, commanded obedience and respect because the 
individual had acquiesced in their ooneeption. By his 
original agreement, a man had done away with his right to 
6 ~., 235. 
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repudiate these laws at will, and was, in fact, indissolubly 
bound by them. The idea that sovereignty could be divided 
was also prevalent at the Constitutional Convention. There 
was nothing in the compact theory that denied that " ••• a 
body of men could surrender a portion of its rights of self-
control and could be bound by its voluntary agreement, thus 
limiting and confining its power of self deterrnination. u1 
A pamphlet written by Pelatiah Webster in 1183 is a good 
example of political thought with which men in the closing 
years of the eighteenth century were most throughly conver-
sant. In the course of this pamphlet Webster traces with un-
mistakable clearness the general outline of the compact 
theory. He was firmly convinced that all talk of unity was 
the most idle chatter, unless the sovereign states were 
willing to transfer at least a part of their sovere~gnty to 
some superior body, which would then be able to render the 
ends of union effectual. If the states insisted on retaining 
their sovereignty in tact, then, Webster said, fI ••• their con-
federation will be a cask without hoops, that may and 
probably will fall to pieces as soon as it is put to any ex-
ercise of strength. it Webster goes on to liken the states in 
a confederation or union to a member of civil society, who 
1 Ibid., 231. 
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" ••• parts with many or his natural rights, that he may enojoy 
the rest in greater security under the protection or society.1t8 
Speaking in the Pennsylvania Convention on behalr or the 
new Constitution, James Wilson comes out clearly in terms 
or the compact philosophy: 
When a single government is instituted, 
the individuals or which it is composed 
surrender to it a part or their natural 
independence, which they enQoyed berore 
as men. When a conrederated republic is 
instituted, the communities in which it 
is composed surrender to it a part or 
their political independence which they 
rormerly enjoyed. 9 
Many more instances could be cited in which it is evident 
that the Fathers or the Constitution were thinking in terms 
or the compact philosophy. But one more will surfice, namely 
the letter which accompanied the Constitution when it was 
presented to the Congress of the Confederation. This letter 
says that the framers had kept steadily in mind the consoli-
dation of the union upon which so much depended. The letter 
shows unmistakably that the members of the Convention believed 
in the creation of a new body, which would be superior to the 
states which had created it. This was really the essence or 
the compact philosophy, the ability of parties through agree-
8 Ibid., 201. 
9 Ibid., 208. 
ment to create a power superior to themselves. 
It isObviously impractical, in the 
federal government of these states, to 
secure all rights of independent 
sovereignty to each, and yet provide for 
the interest and safety of all. Indi-
viduals entering into society must give 
up a share of liberty to secure the 
rest. lO 
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From what we have already said it is evident that 
Calhoun's theories were the antithesis of the compact philoso-
phy. He had taken his ideals from a different source, from 
the organic philosophy of the nineteenth century, which did 
not admit that a new and indissoluble union could be the re-
suIt of agreement. Separate political bodies entering irito a 
compact could not be said to create a new political body with 
powers exceeding those of its creator. For the exponents of 
this new philosophy no law could be binding unless it was the 
will of a preexisting superior. To them the idea of a divided 
sovereignty was an absurdity, for sovereignty was by nature 
indivisible. ll 
With this starting point, it is little wonder that 
Calhoun reached a doctrine in which the states, the original 
sovereigns, were all, and the government of their union 
nothing. Calhoun had forgotten the faith of his Fathers. In 
10 Ibid., 207. 
11 Ibid., 198. 
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his enthusiasm for this new creed, which allowed him to reach 
such felicitous conclusions, he neglected the compact 
philosophy and failed to remember that men who were thinking 
in its terms, 1I ••• could believe in the establishment or a 
permanent and indissoluble body politic as the result of 
agreement between hitherto separate bodies; that they could 
believe in the permanent binding effect of a law which had 
its origin in consent."12 
In treating of Calhoun's departure from the compact 
philosophy of the Fathers, we have, very likely, tended to-
wards over simplification. In honesty, we must admit that 
the line of separation between the two were probably much 
thinner than we have here made them out to be. The reason 
is, I believe, very much as Professor McLaughlin says, that: 
No one who has studied the primary ma-
terial will be ready to assert that men 
consistently and invariably acted upon a 
single principle, that they were alto-
gether conscious of the nature and im-
port of what was being done, and that 
they constantly spoke with logical 
accuracy of the process. Such consis-
tency and philosophic knowledge do not 
appear in the affairs of statesmen. 13 
This idea has already been hinted at in the foregoing 
pages. We mentioned there that the holders of the compact 
12 Ibid., 222. 
13 Ibid., 200. 
philosophy differed among themselves. In some of their 
utterances we find traces of the new organic philosophy. On 
the other hand, as we have also mentioned before, Calhoun was 
not competely free from the influence of days gone by. At 
times some of his ideas and his terminology bear traces of 
the older theory of government. Yet, on the whole, we believe 
the analysis presented in the foregoing pages is essentia11y 
true. Calhoun bad rested his political opinions upon a 
philosophic foundation whose soundness was not generally ad-
mitted fourty years before. In fact, it is difficult to 
imagine any other explanation which would account half so 
well for the irreconcilable character of the opinions on the 
nature of our government fostered in Calhoun's times. 
A glance at the tenor of the opposition with which 
Calhoun's doctrine met in the four years from 1828 to 1832 
Will serve to show how fundamental this divergency of thought 
really was. Andrew Jackson aa President of the United 
states rejected utterly the doctrine espoused by Calhoun. 
His Proclamation, issued in 1832, stating his views " ••• of 
the Constitution and laws applicable to the measures adopted 
by the Convention of South CarOlina ••• ," is the foremost 
state paper of his adminlst~ation. The Proclamation adheres 
strongly to the old compact theory. For Jackson, the idea 
that the Constitution "is a compact between sovereignties, 
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who have preserved their whole sovereignty, and therefore, 
are subject to no superior; that because they made the compact, 
they can break it when, in their opinion, it has been departed 
from by the other states," was an idea resting upon a lIradical 
error. u Jackson points out that Calhoun had abused the term 
"compact." By using "compact" as synonomous with "leaguell 
the advocated of nullification have given it a significance 
which it was never meant to have. It is argued that our 
Constitution is a compact and that every compact between 
sovereign powers is a league and lI ••• that from such an en-
gagement every sovereign power has a right to secede." To 
Jackson the meaning of the word ucompactU was something en~ 
tirely different. A party to a compact may not absolve it-
self from the compact whenever it feels aggrieved. "It is 
precisely because it is a compact they cannot do so. A com-
pact is an agreement or binding obligation." 
Furthermore, Jackson held that the states by ratifying 
the Constitution formed themselves into a single nation. The 
United states was not merely a league between the different 
states. "But each state having expressly parted with so many 
powers as to constitute, jointly with the other states, a 
single nation, cannot, from that period, possess any right to 
secede, because such secession does not break a league, but 
destroys the unity of a nation." Obviously, Jackson believed 
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that agreement could produce a new political body. 
Again the Proclamation held that undivided sovereignty, 
which we have repeatedly seen as pivotal in Calhoun's argu-
mentation, was in opposition to facts. liThe states severally 
have not retained entire sovereignty ••• ," for as they had 
transferred many of the essential elements of sovereignty, 
they could no longer be called sovereign. 
The allegiance of their citizens was 
transferred, in the first instance, to 
the government of the United States; 
they became American citizens, and owed 
obedience to the Constitution of the 
United States, and to law made in con-
formity wi)th the powers vested in 
Congress. 14 
The reaction of the other states to Calhoun's doctrine 
was without exception unfavorable, for their views, like 
Jackson's were basically the opposite of Calhoun's. 
Massachusetts in particular was outspoken against tlle prin-
ciples of nullification. In the report of the Senate 
committee of that state, an accurate analysis of Calhoun's 
doctrine is given: "The states were independent of each 
other at the time when they formed the Constitution; there-
fore they are independent of each other now. 1t In Calhoun's 
system this assertion was equivalent to saying that the states 
E.P. Powell, Nullification and Secession in the United 
States, 1897, Appendix, 308:-- - ---
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were independent after they adopted the Constitution. The 
answer of the Massachusetts committe is significant for its 
clear cut enunciation of compact principles. It W'1.S no more 
preposterous for independent states to form themselves into 
a body politic, than for individuals to become members of 
society. The argument that the states were free and inde-
pendent before the framing of the Constitution and should, 
therefore, be so afterwards was untenable, for,it said, such 
an argument means that two parties to a marriage contract, 
single before its conclusion, must needs be so afterwards. 
liThe rights," the committee declared, "and obligations of the 
parties to a contract are determined by its nature and terms, 
and not by their condition previously to its conclusion." 15 
As we have seen, after he had firmly established the 
doctrine of undivided state sovereignty, Calhoun endeavored 
to reenforce it with the doctrine of the concurrent majority, 
in order to insure the vigorous and unimpeded existence of the 
sovereignty of the states. As a great obstacle to good 
government, Calhoun denounced the prevalent idea that the 
majority should rule. If the numerical majority were allowed 
to work its will, the liberty of the minority could not long 
endure. To safeguard minority rights, Calhoun proposed to 
15 McLaughlin, The Courts, The Constitution and Parties, 234. 
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give tleach division or interest, through its appropriate 
organ either a concurrent voice in making and executing laws, 
or a veto on their execution.1t This idea that the various in-
terests of the community should be considered, if, indeed, 
this is really what Calhoun meant by the concurrent majority, 
is not without its difficulties. Unless there be some other 
phase which we are overlooking, this doctrine does not, on 
the face of it, harmonize with what Calhoun has said con-
cerning the absolute sovereignty of a state in its own affairs. 
For if all interests in a state must constantly be conSidered, 
there would be little room for the exercise of sovereignty. 
Calhoun was at pains to show that the people were bound to 
the Constitution by the absolute will of their sovereign 
states. Could there have been any absolute will where all 
conflicting interests had to be conciliated? At best, we 
must say that there seems to be little logical connection 
between the ideas of absolute state control in its own affairs, 
on the one hand, and the concurrent majority, on the other. 
In his eagerness to upbraid the northeP.nmajority for its 
wanton attitude towards the rights of the southern minority, 
it seems Calhoun had forgotten to remove the moat from his 
own eye~ Even in the state of South Carolina, there was a 
large minority whose views were receiving very little con-
sideration. This group was the Unionists, who had never been 
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able to reconcile themselves to the ideas with which Calhoun 
had won over the South Carolina majority. They opposed 
nullification with all their strength, but to no avail. They 
were left crying in the wilderness, while majority rule led 
their state along the high road to disunion. 
It is conceivable that, under different circumstances, 
Calhoun would not qufte so readily have done away with the 
principle of majority rule. His doctrine on the concurrent 
majority was, curiously enought, very timely for the situation 
which South Carolina was facing. It would act as a strong 
rampart about South Carolina'S beleaguered economic system. 
Slavery, the source of South Carolina's affluence was be-
coming increasingly unpopular in the North and southern 
planters were growing under the dissapproving glance of north-
ern liberation societies. With this state of affairs, it is 
little wonder that the people of South Oarolina sought for 
some check against the ominous shadow of the northern 
majority that was falling everywhere around them. Oalhoun 
must have felt sorely this trial of his people. If he had 
not thought so before, this change in South Carolina's fortunes 
must have made it easy for him to gain the sincerest convic-
tion that majority rule was inimicable to southern interests. 
In mistrusting majority rule, Calhoun had ample prece-
dent in the words and writings of the Constitutional Fathers 
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before him. The words of Adams, Hamilton and Madison could 
be brought forward to assure this point, but let the words of 
Ad~ suffice to show the mind of all three. 
The people when unchecked have been as 
barbarous, unjust, tyrranical, brutal, 
and cruel as any king or senate 
possessed of uncontrollable power; the 
majority has eternally and without ex-
ception usurped over the rights of the 
minority. 16 
What, then, shall we say of Calhoun1s means for protec-
ting minority rights. In a sense, his analysis of our govern-
ment was perfectly correct on this point. The Fathers had 
not intended to make the will of the majority supreme in every 
respect, but, tI ••• in this matter, as in others, Calhoun 
shrewdly and ably used fundamentally sound notions to build 
up his extensive and complex theories •••• "17 His zeal for the 
minority cause as it was embodied in South Carolina, drove 
him to embrace an evil equally as great majority rule. For 
in his system, majority rule was to be replaced by minority 
rule. There is evidence that Calhoun himself was conscious 
of the direction in which his espousal of the concurrent 
majority was leading him, for he denied the charge of minority 
rule. But in spite of his denial, we think he is hardly con-
vincing in his attempt at vindication. In the "Exposition,1I 
16 C.E. Martin, Introduction to the American Constitution, 229 
17 McLaughlin, Constitutional~istOry, 442. 
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Calhoun admits the danger of allowing a: single state to exer-
cise too vital a control in national affairs. The Constitution 
however, makes ~dequate provision on this point, Calhoun re-
minds us. By the amending clause, an individual state, a 
minority, must be subject to the will of three fourths of the 
states, a majority. This, he feels, will eliminate all 
possibility of minority ascendency. 
Did the matter end there with the expression of the will 
of three fourths of the states, we might admit Calhoun's 
claim, but in his system, a state need not accept this ex-
pression of the will of the majority. Her sovereignty left 
her the alternative of secession. 18 An agreement between 
sovereign states could not be binding. What was to prevent 
a disallusioned state from severing her connections with the 
Union? 
Had the pressure of circumstance not pushed so mightily 
against Calhoun, we feel he might have manifested more pa-
tience with the principle of majority rule. Most certainly 
it was a principle beset by danger; its misuse could well 
end in the grossest tyranny. And Calhoun was right 1I ••• when 
he insisted that human ingenuity must contrive safeguards 
for the minority. But the evils of majority rule can never 
-------~ .. -,---.. ,-.,. 
18 Calhoun, Works, VI, 55. 
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be cured by turning the control of the government over to the 
minority. lf l9 Actually, the safeguards which Calhoun desired 
had been furnished by the Constitution, but they were safe-
guards not particularly well adapted for preventing the evils 
of which Calhoun's constitutents complained. Seeing, as he 
did, all things in the light of South Carolina'S misfortunes, 
Calhoun could admit no safeguard which allowed any quarter 
to majority rule. This, however, as Lincoln brought out 
later, was exactly the kind of safeguard the Constitutional 
Fathers had provided: 
A majority held in restraint by consti-
tutional checks and limitations, and al-
ways changing easily with deliberate 
changes of public opinions and sentiments, 
is the only true sovereign of a free 
people •••• Unanimity is impossible; the 
rule of a minority is wholly inadmissible; 
so that, rejecting the majority principle, 
anarchy or despotism in some form is all 
that is left. 20 
The idea of diversity of interest between North and 
south must have preyed upon Calhoun's mind, and he dwelt at 
great length on this point in his speeches and writings. In 
vivid words he showed that the South could no more lie down 
with the North, than could the lamb with the lion. Again, 
we must remember Calhoun's peculiar position. He was con-
fronted on all sides with the picture of South Carolina'S 
19 
20 
W.S. Carpenter, Development of American Political Thought, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1930,-Y63. 
A. Lincoln, Works, as quoted in Carpenter, 163. 
'! 
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economic distress, and his visi6n, for want of variety, must 
necessarily have become drawn and narrow. He could hardly 
have been expected to see the forces of unity that were at 
work. Granting that the balance in Calhoun's day moved 
heavily toward the side of sectional diversity, it must still 
be admitted that the side of COmmon interest was not alto-
gether without its pull. Unbiased reflection, had this been 
possible to Calhoun in those trying times, might have re-
vealed this fact to him. He would have seen that a thoroughly 
weakened and impoverished South, would in time have produced 
like misery in the North. Eventually he could have understood 
that a majority, whenever it is capable of looking after its 
own interests, may also be worthily entrusted with the pro-
tection of minority interests. We reason thus, because, 
first of all, the major issues with which the lesser body 
is concerned will be comprehended in those of the larger 
body. Secondly, " ••• parties in a republic-the only form 
of government in which the terms majority and minority are 
legitimate expressions-do not occupy the same fixed position 
which they have in a monarchy and an aristocracy •••• tI But 
rather, fI •••• in a country where free institutions exist, 
all the great interests of the minority will be enclosed 
in those of the majority. tf 2l 
21 Carpenter, 163. 
As is evident, there are many points in Calhoun's doc-
trine with which we might cavil. Yet, even if every point 
of his theory stood up perfectly to all the criticism that 
was ever leveled at it, there is still one instance, I be-
lieve, in which it would fail utterly. Calhoun, for all 
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his argumentative genius, was not a very practical man. His 
theory bears the imprint of his impracticability. In con-
structing his system, he showed a marked inability to come 
to grips with and to master trends and conditions other than 
those which immediately confronted him. In a statesman this 
would probably be labeled lack of vision or foresight. And 
this, I believe, is a severe criticism to make of a states-
man, yet, it is one of which Calhoun is not entirely unde-
serving. 
By this I would not deny the incontestable strength of 
Calhoun's doctrine on some points. In regard to certain 
facts of history, it was quite unassailable. His estimation 
of the popular mind in 1789 was accurate enough. No one 
could contradict him when he asserted that sovereignty was 
a thing few if any of the thirteen states would willingly 
have parted with. A people so recently free of one 
tyranny, were little inclined to risk establishing another 
by setting up a strong national government. In the chapter 
on the Articles of Confederation, we saw how the states 
--
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mistrusted any power outside their own borders. The Consti-
tutional Convention was intended merely to alter the ~ticles. 
Bitter controversy ensued when the idea was put forward, that 
the Articles of Confederation should be replaced by a new 
instrument of government, and the Convention waS split by two 
contradictory opinions. One group held out for the superlo~l~ 
of the individual states; another desi~ed to make the states 
subject to a national government in certain paramount issues. 
The result was the Constitution, a great compromise; in some 
respects upholding the primacy of the states, while giving 
supremacy in other matters to the national government. The 
course of events proved it to be an instrument more favorable 
to national power than to state power, but this was by no 
means generally known in 1787. True, a number of passages in 
the Constitution give the impression of national superiority, 
but Calhoun and his theory are sufficient proof that the matter 
was never definitively settled. Circumstances would have 
made it unwise for the members of the Convention to assert 
without reservation the supremacy of the national government. 
As we have noted before, the people were not yet ready for 
such a declaration and had they been generally appraised of 
the nationalist trappings that our government would take on, 
it is not difficult to believe that the Constitution would 
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never have been ratiried. 22 
Quite as correct as Calhoun's appraisal or the popular 
mind in 1787, was his conviction that the Constitution of the 
United States had been ratified by the individual states. 
For, " ••• if anything is clear beyond peradventure in the 
history of the United States, it is that the Constitution 
was established by the states •••• " 23 With these two racts 
for a foundation, Calhoun went on to build up the govern-
mental system which we have already reviewed. 
However, in spite of the validity of Calhoun's his-
torical arguments, there is still room for the charge of im-
practicality that we have made against him. Calhoun seems 
to have made no allowances for the difficulties with which 
the Constitutional Convention w~s raced. The men of the 
Convention were charged with the difficult task of arresting 
the country in its bolt towards anarchy. Their days had 
seen unmistakable signs of this awful spectre in the states. 
The action that was taken at Philadelphia that summer, was 
probably the only thing that could have saved the states. 
By insisting so strenuously on adherence to the popular mind 
of 1787, Calhoun was, in reality, giving approval to majority 
22 W. MacDonald, Jacksonian Democracy, Harpers, New York 
1906, 107. 
23 Ibid., 109. 
rule in its worst form. Is it too much to say that ex-
perienced and patriotic leaders understood better than the 
mass of the people, what was best for the country? After 
all, the men of the Convention did not intend to sell the 
states into bondagel The states were merely being saved from 
themselves. By yielding some of their rights, they were 
receiving in return peace and prosperity. Could anyone 
honestly maintain that a blacksmith in New York, or a planter 
in Georgia, or a farmer in Pennsylvania was better qualified 
to remedy the evils of America in that day than a Washington, 
a Hamilton, or a Madison? Is not this very point, the rule 
of the uneducated, one of the major shortcomings of democ-
racy? These were all practical considerations which escaped 
Calhoun. Had he been less fettered by circumstances, less 
hampered by the needs of his native state, Calhoun might have 
lent his attention to these facts, which, while they tend to 
weaken his argmaent, are, none the less, of great moment. 
From the time when the Constitution had first been given 
the force of law, a broad trend was followed in its inter-
pretation. This was the trend which John Marshall, more 
than any other man, had helped to establish. The decisions 
of Marshall were written in bold letters across the horizons 
of American political life: 
Let the end, he said, be legitimate, let 
it be within the scope of the Consti-
tution, and all means which are 
appropriate, which are plainly adapted 
to that end, which are not prohibited, 
but consist with the letter and spirit 24 
of the Constitution, are constitutional. 
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Would not ignorance on so general a point have been impossible 
for a man of public affairs like Calhoun? Surely, then, 
he showed little practicality in kicking against the goad 
as he insisted upon doing. 
Granting, as we do, that Calhoun was sincere in the 
conviction that he upheld, we cannot for this reason avoid 
calling his plans to set aside the laws of the United ~tates 
visionary. Calhoun's theories, however legal and authentic 
their historical foundations, would have destroyed the 
Union. IISelf preservation and the nature of things, 
accordingly, if nothing else, will lead the central govern-
ment to resort to force to uphold its authority. 1I25 
Weighed down by narrow sectional interests, Calhoun 
failed to behold the dangers to which he was subjecting the 
rest of the nation. If any state, on any issue, was quali-
fied to countermand the authority of the national govern-
ment, who can say where the practice would have ended. 
24 Martin, 107. 
25 MacDonald, 110. 
What a nice checker-board the United 
States might have become, if the exercise 
of this right (nullification and se-
cession) should get to be the fashionl 
Suppose the States at the mouths of the 
great streams, and four or five others 
commanding part of their navigable waters, 
should secede, what a pretty picture th~6 
map of the United States would present! 
With mention, then, of the impracticality of Calhoun 
and the system he advocated, we may close our study of the 
political theories of John C. Calhoun. But first, let us 
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summarize briefly the study we have made. To gain a better 
understanding of the Constitution, we reviewed the Articles 
of Confederation and the principles that animated them. Our 
purpose in analyzing the Constitution was the attainment of 
a better understanding of what Calhoun was later to make of 
this instrument. We were interested in finding what particular 
aspect of the Constitution enabled Calhoun to spin out the 
theories that he did. Then, before turning to his doctrines 
themselves, we studied the conditions and circumstances from 
which these theories took their rise. Undivided state 
sovereignty, the concurrent majority, and nullification, 
we saw, were the cardinal points in Calhoun's system. 
Finally, we attempted to evaluate the ideas which Calhoun 
had propounded. We saw that his notion of sovereignty 
26 H. Von Holst, John C. Calhoun, Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, Boston, 1899, 101. 
99 
was based on a foundation, that without any too great exertion 
cou~ be made to totter dangerously. Then, in holding out 
for a type of sovereignty that was indivisible, Calhoun was 
rejecting the compact ideas of the Constitutional Convention. 
We admitted with Calhoun that there is need of a check upon 
majority rule, but we could see no purpose in having that 
check consist merely in substituting minority for majority 
rule. Lastly, we felt compelled to label the right of 
nullification that Calhoun so longed to see in the hands of 
the states, as something visionary and qUite unworthy of a 
mind that should have been taken up with the practical 
affairs of government. 
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